ISRAEL AND THE EASTERN ARAB STATES: A STRATEGIC SOURCE BOOK

Bernard Reich, et al

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

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

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Israel and the Eastern Arab States:

A Strategic Source Book

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RESEARCH ANALYSIS CORPORATION

McLEAN, VIRGINIA

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FOREWORD

Recent events in the Middle East, particularly the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, have once again highlighted the area as a focal point of interest and concern to the major world powers. The complexity of the region has been further evidenced by the factors involved in the 1967 conflict and its aftermath.

This source book makes readily available a brief appraisal of factors of strategic significance in the Eastern Arab states and Israel. Accompanying the survey are charts, tables, other supporting data, and references assembled from numerous sources, both Middle Eastern and Western, and compiled in this paper to facilitate their use.

It is intended that this survey will provide the user with an understanding of the factors at work in the Middle East, the data in support of the conclusions reached, and sources for more detailed examination of the subjects discussed. Although the compilation is focused on factors of a strategic nature, it is not intended to deal solely with that aspect of Israel and the Eastern Arab states.

The authors wish to acknowledge the especial assistance of Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, Mr. Richard M. Preece, and Mrs. Mildred C. Vreeland in reviewing and constructively criticizing the draft.

John P. Hardt
Head, Strategic Studies Department

CONTENTS

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ABBREVIATIONS

CENTO	Central Treaty Organization
EEC	European Economic Community
GNP	gross national product
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCC	Palestine Conciliation Committee
UAR	United Arab Republic
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSCOP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

THE MIDDLE EAST: DEFINITION OF THE REGION

The definition of any region is essentially arbitrary even if the unit is continental or hemispheric in scope. By its very nature the Middle East is perhaps the most difficult of all regional units to define because its components are, to a great extent, the "leftovers" of other areas; because even Middle Easterners disagree as to the content of their region; and because it includes states geographically located on the African and Eurasian continents and often included in discussions of those areas. To further compound the problem, the area is not uniformly referred to as the "Middle East" but is sometimes known as the "Near East," as for example, by the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Department of State. The Department of Defense refers to the area as the Middle East.[1]

The term "Middle East" generally describes the area extending from Egypt [United Arab Republic (UAR)] in the west to Iran in the east and from Turkey in the north to the People's Republic of Southern Yemen in the south (see Fig. 1). The region thus defined includes Turkey, Iran, Israel, the UAR, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and the People's Republic of Southern Yemen, as well as various territories (including Bahrain, Muscat and Oman, Qatar, and the Trucial states). The unit just delineated forms a complete whole with geographical, economic, historical, political, and strategic overtones and features. However, division of the Middle East into various subregional units is both convenient and logical for purposes of detailed analysis. Thus this report will focus on the Eastern Arab states and Israel, a distinct subregion suitable for independent consideration.

Fig. 1—The Middle East

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE REGION

The overall strategic importance of the Middle East is essentially attributable to two factors: geographic location and oil. The Middle East also has been regarded as an area of significance and interest because Judaism, Christianity, and Islam had their origins in the area and many holy places of these three monotheistic faiths are located there.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

Located at the hub of Europe, Asia, and Africa, the Middle East is a crossroads and a bridge. It bounds on the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, the Black Sea, and the Caspian Sea. This geographical position was of historical significance for land trade routes and is of contemporary importance for land, sea, and air communications linking Western and Eastern Europe with Eastern Africa, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, the Far East, and Australasia. Probably the most noteworthy of these communications links in the contemporary era is the maritime passage through the Suez Canal—the shortest shipping route between Western Europe and Asia, and the primary one for the shipment of oil from the Persian Gulf to Western Europe. It is also an important route for shipment of other goods between Europe and Indian–Pacific Ocean locations. Despite its advantageous location and previously continuous increases in number of transits, net tonnage, number of passengers, and revenue earned, the Canal's increasing tolls and technical limitations[2] will restrict its use to a growing extent. Its vulnerability to air attack and blockage is particularly important in times of conflict. (See Tables 1 to 12.)

The Turkish Straits, whose control strengthens any state interested in the Black Sea–Mediterranean area, constitute the second major international waterway of the Middle East. Russia evidenced a historical interest in control and dominance of the Straits and the Soviet Union has maintained this interest. Effective control of the Straits can prevent a Black Sea power from having access to the Mediterranean. Alternatively, an outside power can advance toward the heartland of the Soviet Union by traversing the Straits and entering the Black Sea. The Straits also have economic significance as a transport route to and from the Black Sea and various world markets.

The importance of the Mediterranean Sea in terms of its peacetime use for trade and its military value for warships and supply ships adds to the strategic significance of the states bounding on it.[3] The Gulf of Aqaba, connecting the Israeli port of Eilat and the Jordanian port of Aqaba with the Red

Sea and the Indian Ocean, has an intrinsic value primarily to Israel and Jordan, but its significance also must be judged in terms of the role it played in the 1956 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. The Bab el Mandeb is an important strait at the southern end of the Red Sea, the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, and separates southwestern Arabia from the Horn of Africa.

Middle East air routes provide direct flight paths from Europe to Asia and the Pacific and offer good climatic and geographic conditions. North-to-south air routes from Europe and the Soviet Union also cross the Middle East. The importance of these communications links across the Middle East will continue to increase with the growth of African and Asian participation in world production, world trade, and international affairs.

The geographic position of the Middle East has made it a logical area for bases and staging posts (see Table 13) as it provides a convenient focal point for military activity on three continents and is proximate to the Soviet Union. This has long been recognized and forms part of the rationale for continued attempts at control of the region by outside powers.[4] Although the military need for controlling these communications axes and of having air bases in the region during conflict has diminished owing to the increasing range of aircraft and intercontinental missiles, the region retains military importance because it constitutes a segment of the rimland of the Soviet Union and because two states—Turkey and Iran—border directly on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A breakout by the Soviet Union from its interior heartland position and control of coastal areas on major sea routes would both be strategically advantageous.

OIL

Oil is the major natural resource of the Middle East. The area is credited with at least 60 percent of the world's proved oil reserves, and a potential remains for future discoveries. Most Middle East oil is centered in the Persian Gulf area. Local consumption is low, allowing the bulk of production to be exported. At present the Middle East supplies about one-third of total world oil needs. Access to this oil and use of it at reasonable prices are not vital to the US or the Soviet Union as both have their own sources of supply. Western Europe, which obtains about three-fourths of its crude petroleum imports from the Middle East, could get along without this supply of petroleum for limited periods, though the cost of such a cutoff would be high.[5] (See also Tables 14 to 19.) Over any long-term period, however, oil from the Middle East is an important energy source for the industry and economy of Western Europe despite technological advances in the energy field, particularly in the use of atomic energy, and alternative supply sources in North Africa and those resulting from the North Sea gas strikes. Although there has been and there will continue to be increasing development and use of nuclear power, Western Europe's need for oil should increase.[6]

The oil industry of the Middle East continues to provide good potential for investment from the US and Western Europe, and large-scale Western investment remains the major source of operating capital.[7] Despite the specter of possible nationalization, foreign investment has remained at a consistently high level in most oil-producing states. Oil revenue is particularly important to the oil-producing states of the region since it is a major source of foreign exchange for economic development programs.[8] (See Tables 20 to 23.)

MIDDLE EAST ENVIRONMENT

SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

The population of the Middle East is approximately 130 million (Table 24), largely concentrated in the river valleys and along the seacoasts. The population growth rate, which averages 2.5 percent per year, poses a serious problem to most Middle Eastern countries[9]—it has a retarding effect on development and limits or negates possible improvements in the standard of living. In most of the Arab states, modern health methods make it possible to significantly lengthen life expectancy, which is now relatively short (see Table 25). Moreover none of the states with high population growth rates have effective birth-control programs. These factors, including the fact that a large percentage of the population is under 25 years of age, will contribute to continuing high population growth rates in the future with deleterious ramifications in many sectors.

The general literacy level is low (see Table 25); less than 40 percent of the population of the area can be classified as literate, although there are significant differences in the literacy levels of various states. Efforts toward improvement of educational levels constitute major components of the development schemes of most states in the area. In part this low level of literacy may be traced to Islamic tradition, which considered education as its own function rather than one to be performed by the state. The maintenance of this concept has hindered the attempt at universal education and has deleteriously affected the content of educational curricula. In addition to the high illiteracy levels, the educated population segments remain essentially untrained in employable skills and disciplines. The educational effort is expanding in terms of numbers of students, curricula content, and utilization of new educational techniques, particularly the use of mass media and military forces as instruments of basic literacy training.

The population of the Middle East can be divided essentially into three ecological categories—bedouin, rural-village, and urban. The bedouin form a small part of the total population of the region and only on the Arabian Peninsula do they constitute a significant percentage of the inhabitants. The largest population group is the fellahin (peasants) who work small plots of land as owners or sharecroppers and are a part of the agricultural-village complex of rural society. The urban population generally forms only a small percentage of the total population (see Table 26) but tends to be the controlling factor in political, economic, and social activity and organization.

Within the Middle East one should note the ever-increasing development of the "new man," who is gradually forming a core within Middle Eastern society and replacing the existing "traditional" man. Both groups are represented in the various social, economic, religious, and political groupings and at most levels of society. Despite differences within their number, these new men share values involving the concept of change and the alteration of existing society. Although varying in intensity from one political unit to another, this traditional-modern dichotomy is present in all Middle Eastern states and is an increasingly significant factor.[10]

No Middle Eastern state is without its minorities (see Table 27). In Iraq the Sunni-Shia religious division as well as the Kurdish-Arab division should be noted. The Kurds are Muslims but form a distinct ethnic group and speak an Indo-European language instead of Arabic. In Iraq they occupy the mountainous north-northeast region of the country and have made demands for autonomy. In recent times there have been several Kurdish insurrections in Iraq, and the Kurds have been a threat to stability to a lesser degree in Iran and Turkey where they also form a significant minority. The Kurds have not been integrated or successfully quelled in any of these states, although there have been several unsuccessful attempts to do so in Iraq and more successful attempts in Iran and Turkey. In Jordan the Palestinian Arabs, who constitute some two-thirds of the population, remain a threat to the stability of the Hashemite monarchy. The Alawites form a minority in Syria but play a dominant role in that state's military establishment—a cause of friction within the system. In Yemen the Zaidi sect has political dominance as contrasted with probable Shafii numerical superiority.[11] In Lebanon there is some dispute over the existence of a true majority, and although the National Pact maintains the legal fiction of a 6 to 5 Christian-to-Muslim ratio, it is generally assumed that the actual population ratio ranges between 6 to 5 and 8 to 5 Muslim-to-Christian. These minorities contribute to internal tension and ofttimes pose problems of internal security. They tend to be influenced by events outside the control of the government under which they live and are open to manipulation by opposing forces within the region as well as by outside powers (e.g., the Soviet machinations in Kurdish Iraq).

ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT

The Middle East is generally characterized by economic underdevelopment with little industrial activity other than that associated with oil production and distribution and with the main economic occupations of agriculture and animal husbandry. The cultivated portion of the Middle East covers approximately 5 to 7½ percent of the total area. Nevertheless agriculture is the main occupation of more than four-fifths of the inhabitants; a further proportion of the population is employed in processing agricultural products. In the arid areas of the Middle East the basic way of life is pastoral nomadism, but this involves few people. The level of production and quality of crops are generally low, and the Middle Eastern farmer is but one-eighth to one-fourth as efficient

a producer as his counterpart in Western Europe or the US. In much of the area the inhabitants are among the poorest fed in the world, and the states must import food despite an overwhelming involvement in cultivation. Agricultural production is limited by factors such as excessive heat, aridity, heavy salinization of irrigated lands, pests, crop diseases, workers' diseases, and archaic methods of landholding and forms of tenancy. The prospects for improvement in the agricultural sector are not very bright. Remedial action, including crop adaptation, irrigation, and the consolidation of small plots of land into economically productive units, tends to be too limited in scope to effect a significant improvement. An important factor in this regard is the low esteem in which agriculture is held and the lack of social and political prestige associated with that endeavor. Output and productivity may increase, but so too will the population.[12]

Little industrialization has taken place in the region as a whole because few of the states have the capital and other conditions necessary for industrialization.[13] Acquisition of sufficient foreign exchange to secure the equipment and skills needed to build the physical plant and train the needed personnel is generally lacking. Attraction of foreign investment capital has been a focus of much government activity although success in securing changes in the investment climate has generally been limited. Oil revenues have been the source of much of the foreign exchange available for such development efforts. Only Turkey, Iran, Israel, and Egypt have a significant degree of industrial activity in comparison with the other states in the region, and even in the former states industrial concentration is on light consumer products and agricultural processing. Middle Eastern industrial products are generally uncompetitive on the world market, and this trend is likely to continue in the future. Finding markets for produced goods remains a major problem in the attempt to develop the economies of the states of the region.

Low productivity in both agriculture and industry and excessive dependence on agriculture depress the level of national income in the states of the Middle East (see Table 24). Per capita gross national product (GNP) ranges from $120 in Yemen to $450 in Lebanon. The highest rate for the Arab states is found in Kuwait, whose artificially high rate of $3196 is comparable to that of the US and is based on its large oil production. Israel has a per capita GNP of $1325. The general maldistribution of wealth and income drives still lower the income level of the masses, and a large part of any increase in national income tends to be absorbed by population growth.

Middle East exports are composed essentially of agricultural products and mineral resources (oil), whereas imports include capital goods, manufactured consumption articles, raw materials, and foodstuffs. Most states, excluding the large oil producers, have serious balance-of-payments difficulties because their imports exceed exports (see Table 28).

All Middle Eastern states have committed themselves to modernization. Economic development is a critical part of the modernization process and is a particularly important problem in the Middle East because of the current low level of achievement. Although the economic situation in the region has shown improvement during the last 40 years, it has fallen far short of evidenced needs. Although the states take various approaches and utilize numerous techniques in approaching the problem of development, they are essentially agreed

in terms of desired accomplishments. The serious problems of narrow markets, low and maldistributed national incomes, scarce suitable raw materials, high fuel and energy costs, low worker efficiency, few technically and managerially skilled people, inadequate transport systems, capital shortages, and high population growth rates will continue to retard development.

The modernization process, which seeks political and economic development and social engineering, can contribute to stability and internal security by removing as a possible subversion source those elements of society that have or might become disaffected as a result of not participating fully in existing societies. However, in the short run, economic development is usually accompanied by social turbulence as peasants emigrate to large cities and new conditions are created in rural areas.[14] Existing problems of sanitation, health, education, and security tend to be exacerbated by new industrial slums. Even with development planning and implementation of modernization designs it will continue to be difficult to find employment for all who are capable, and the unemployed and underemployed will continue to constitute between one-fourth and one-half of the available labor force.

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The states of the Middle East present a variety of political systems. These variations reflect numerous factors, including differences in historical background, colonial domination, social and economic conditions, religion, population pressure, geographic setting, climate, proximity to major trade routes, and strategic value. Despite different backgrounds and existing conditions, the Arab states have common characteristics that affect their political systems directly or indirectly. These include the heritage of Islam, the presence of foreign (primarily Western) influence and domination in the immediate past, and concentration of leadership in the urban upper and middle classes, and the rise of a new elite of technocrats and military officers.

The nature of the Middle Eastern political systems is such that the application of Western standards of classification and the employment of Western categories are of little utility. The systems can be grouped by reference to their characteristic manner of problem solving, whether domestic or foreign. They can be categorized, in essence, by their "style" rather than by their theoretical constitutional structure. This approach results in four categories in the area under discussion.

The first group of states, including Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Southern Yemen, and Iraq, may be described as "radical" or "revolutionary" in orientation. Power is based essentially on a new elite dissatisfied with the existing situation internally and within the Arab world. Attempts continue to be made at socialist revolutionary change in an effort to transform these states into modernized entities. An active foreign policy is pursued to increase the influence and position of the radicals throughout the Arab world.

The second group is comprised of "moderate" states—Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Both states are monarchial,[15] though neither the institution of the

monarchy nor the monarchs are alike in the two countries. Both Hussein and Faisal control most of the effective power in their states and base their regimes on traditional elements in society. Domestically these regimes are relatively satisfied with the status quo, but they utilize an evolutionary approach to achieve modernization. Emphasis in foreign policy is on regional stability, and they tend to be defensive rather than activist in orientation.

The third category of states consists of Kuwait and Lebanon, which are essentially "neutral" in inter-Arab affairs owing to unique domestic and regional constraints—Lebanon because of its demographic breakdown and the sectarian nature of its system and Kuwait because of the threat of absorption by Iraq as well as the minority position of the Kuwaitis in their own state. These two states perceive their survival as being inextricably intertwined with a position of neutrality in inter-Arab affairs and a cautious approach to internal problem solving to avoid upsetting existing delicate balances. Verbally they tend to support the goals of the radical states on issues such as Palestine but seem to prefer the methods of the moderate states in practical action.

Israel falls into a category by itself and may be regarded as closely approximating Western-style parliamentary democracies.

The traditional elite of kings, landowners, and bourgeoisie is declining in power or has already been replaced in most of the political units of the area. The great majority of the population, the workers and peasants, are only beginning to enter the realm of politics. A new salaried middle class is emerging, or has emerged, as the most active political, social, and economic force in the region. Leadership is increasingly being held by this class of men—salaried civilian and military politicians, organizers, administrators, and experts, augmented by secondary and university students. This group of politically oriented individuals is further supplemented by the military, which, in most of these states, forms the core of this new middle class striving to modernize the state. The central role of the military in the politically conscious middle class is a result of its training, skills, and motivation. In the more radical states the military, drawing on the lower classes and not the traditional elite, tends to be the major state institution organized along nationalist, modern, and secular lines without commitments to the past. It has a defined code, a clear line of command, channels of communication, mobility, and force.

REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Conflict between alternative ideological positions and their political ramifications has a significant impact on regional stability and external involvement in the Middle East. Most noteworthy are the conflict between moderate and radical Arab positions manifested in inter-Arab, or Arab-Arab, disputes and the conflict between Arab nationalism and political Zionism manifested in the Arab-Israeli dispute.

That the Middle East is a region of tension is evidenced, in part, by the amount of resources expended on instruments of force (see Table 29), which is proportionately greater than that spent on other regions. These expenditures result in the diversion of scarce economic resources from development

programs to the arms race. As the weaponry has become more sophisticated and more expensive, the costs of the military burden to the states of the Middle East have increased.[16] Between 1945 and May 1967 there was a considerable influx of armaments into the area (see Tables 30 to 34) including over 1500 combat jet aircraft, 2800 tanks, and 31 warships. These arms shipments pose a particular problem in the Middle East because of the numerous sources of supply and the variety of means of payment available. The influx of arms has a direct relation to the problems of regional and state security and has contributed to the tension that is characteristic of the region. It has exacerbated regional quarrels such as the Arab-Israeli dispute, inter-Arab disputes, and Arab–Northern Tier tensions. (Iran in particular has been concerned about the Arab threat posed by Nasser to its national interests.) In some cases the weapons have been used for domestic political purposes.

Arab Nationalism, Arab Unity, and Inter-Arab Conflicts

Some concept of Arab nationalism or unity of the Arab states in a supranational unit has been current in the Arab world since the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt.[17] However, the idea did not develop into a movement of political relevance until WWI,and even at that time it became little more than a generalized concept supported by limited political and military action.

In the interwar period, various Arab nationalist groups agitated for the establishment of independent Arab states and, to a lesser extent, for some form of union of those states. Although independence was achieved in several Arab states between the two wars, unity of those units was hardly considered. At the outset of WWII the British government, notably in the person of Anthony Eden, provided impetus for Arab nationalism,[18] and with some British encouragement the Arab League was established by 1945. Despite the Arab League's commitment to the concept of Arab cooperation and coordination and its tentative beginnings toward full-fledged Arab unity, little real movement toward this goal has been made

Arab nationalists tend to conceive of the Arab world as a homogeneous unit and of the Arab people as a single nation bound by ties of a common language, religion, and history. Although there is probably greater cultural affinity and agreement on the idea of a single nation in the Arab states than in any other region of the world, the content of the concept of an Arab state remains vague. Aspirations for Arab unity are usually approached by Arab leaders as political factors to be used in acquiring control over other Arab states. The vested interests of various leaders, governmental bureaucracies, and military establishments tend to overrule popular pressure in determining the success of pan-Arabism. Some states (particularly Saudi Arabia) advocate Islamic unity, which is anathema to those (such as Egypt) undergoing social revolution; and radical leaders tend to press for a socialist-oriented pan-Arab unity, which is unacceptable to many of the more moderate political units. Also to be weighed are varying ethnic and religious compositions, differing rates of social, political, and economic development, and unequal distribution of natural resources and population.

The assumption that opposition to Israel has been a major factor in promoting Arab unity is supported by a semblance of vocal unity on the Palestine problem.

Practical and united action displaying this unity has been lacking even during actual warfare between Israel and various Arab states. The differences among the Arab states are apparent in radio and newspaper propaganda battles, withdrawals from the Arab League, and the collapse of united Arab instrumentalities such as the Unified Arab Command. The principal inter-Arab conflict to date has been the Yemeni civil war[19] in which Egyptian armed forces supported the republicans and Saudi Arabian arms and gold were given to the royalists. At times Jordan supported the royalists and Syria the republicans. This dispute is likely to remain a focal point of inter-Arab disagreements in the future. Although popular pressure for unity will tend to increase, any attempted unions seem destined not to succeed. The entire complex relationship of Arab states to one another thus remains the key unresolved issue in the Arab world.

Arab Nationalism and Political Zionism in Conflict: The Arab-Israeli Dispute

The Arab-Israeli dispute is essentially the result of the conflict, in both theory and practical application, of two ideologies: political Zionism and Arab nationalism.[20] The failure to achieve a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict may be attributed to the foreign policies of the Arab states and Israel, as well as to the incompatibility of their ideologies.[21]

Zionism viewed the establishment of a Jewish state as necessary for the preservation of world Jewry. This Jewish state could only be established in Palestine—its historical location. By contrast Arab nationalists hold that the independence and unity of all Arab states must be secured. Palestine is regarded as an integral part of the Arab world.[22]

Although the Arab nationalist movement received its earliest impetus from the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 and developed under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, WWI accelerated its political role in the Middle East and prepared the setting for its conflict with Zionism's program for the area. During the war the British made arrangements with the French, the Arabs, and the Zionists, which laid the basis for the division of the Ottoman Empire and provided the foundation for the claims of both Arab nationalists and Zionists in their dispute over control of Palestine. These documents included an exchange of correspondence between Sharif Hussein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner for Egypt,[23,24] the Sykes-Picot Agreement,[25] and the Balfour Declaration.[26] After WWI neither the McMahon nor the Balfour statement was fullfilled. In part, this resulted from their mutually conflicting nature and from the fact that both were negated by provisions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. British control replaced Ottoman rule in Palestine in 1917. The Palestine Mandate was allocated to Britain by the Allied Supreme Council on 25 April 1920 and was confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations on 22 July 1922.

The Zionists adopted a program designed to secure the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. This program included the establishment of the Jewish Agency and Jewish local government in Palestine under the Mandate and increasing the size of the Jewish community in Palestine through immigration (which also served the goal of a haven for persecuted Jewry) and through monetary support, which enabled the community to purchase land and maintain itself.

The Arab nationalists were embittered by the establishment of the Mandate, which shifted independence from a "right" embodied in the pledge to Sharif Hussein to a future eventuality under the Mandate system. Though divisive factors were strong, there was general Arab agreement on opposition to the Mandate system. The Arabs adopted a program of noncooperation with the Mandatory regime in an effort to achieve Arab self-government and independence. They protested Jewish immigration and land purchases in an effort to limit the number and power of Jews in Palestine so that an Arab majority and Arab control would be assured when self-determination was offered. During most of the Mandatory period[27] anti-Zionist activities were coordinated by various Palestine Arab groups including the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab Higher Executive. On its establishment in 1945 the Arab League was charged with the task of coordinating Arab opposition to the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine and of mustering support for an Arab Palestine state.[28]

The submission of the Mandate problem to the United Nations (UN) on 2 April 1947 provided an opportunity for both the Arabs and the Jews to present their positions[29] to the UN and to secure their desired goals. After preliminary debate the General Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to consider the problem. UNSCOP presented two plans for consideration, and its majority plan was approved by the General Assembly on 29 November 1947 as US Resolution 181-II.[30] It provided for the parition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, joined in an economic union. Jerusalem was to be governed by a separate international authority under US supervision. The Jewish Agency generally favored the partition plan. The Arab delegates declared that they would not recognize the UN resolution and served notice that were it to be implemented they would "reserve freedom of action."[31]

Increased hostility between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine followed the adoption of the partition resolution and resulted in conflict in late 1947. Despite this de facto war in Palestine, which raised doubts that the partition plan could be implemented,[32] Britain announced its intention to terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948. The Jewish Agency prepared the Declaration of Independence of the new Jewish state and announced it in Tel Aviv on 14 May. Arab preparations were designed to achieve the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine through the use of military force.

On 15 May 1948 the Secretary-General of the Arab League informed the Security Council of the intervention of the Arab League in Palestine to achieve peace and order and to restore the territory to the Palestine Arabs.[33] The ensuing hostilities were terminated by the signing of armistice agreements between Israel and the four contiguous Arab states [Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan (later Jordan)] from February to July 1949.[34] Since then, and until 1967, war erupted only in 1956 when Israel, England, and France joined in an attack on Egypt, though terrorist and reprisal raids have been frequent features of the Middle Eastern scene. By and large the parties have channeled their efforts into a cold war of continual friction, which has manifested itself in a series of problems and issues including Israel's existence, its territory and boundaries, the status of Jerusalem, the status of the refugees, the Arab boycott of Israel, the blockade of Suez and Aqaba to Israeli shipping, and the utilization of the waters of the Jordan River.

Although these problems remain at the core of Arab-Israeli relations, the extent of change wrought by the 1967 war has modified their content. Israel occupies the Gaza Strip, the Sinai peninsula, the West Bank of the Jordan River, the city of Jerusalem, and the Syrian highlands. Problems of administration and economics aside,[35] Israel is in a military position superior to any it has occupied since its founding and has indicated that it will not withdraw from these occupied territories without prior Arab guarantees concerning its security and without negotiations with its Arab neighbors.[36] The Arab states have held the view that negotiations with Israel are impossible as long as Israel controls the Arab territories captured during the Six Day War. The continuation of the Arab-Israeli dispute contributes to the tension in the region and portends the recurrence of conflict such as that which erupted in 1967. Future regional conflict might not be limited to local participants, and great-power confrontation, perhaps at the level of general war, is a possibility that should not be lightly dismissed.

EXTERNAL INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Great-power interests in the Middle East have been and continue to be motivated principally by considerations essentially unrelated to internal Middle Eastern developments. In the final analysis these interests have been derivative of Middle Eastern geography and resources and the major powers have been involved in establishing bases (see Table 13) and/or securing lines of communication. They have been eager to develop outlets for goods and capital and to secure raw materials (in the twentieth century this has become almost synonymous with oil) or to deny these to others (particularly "hostile" great powers). These interests traditionally provided substance for such phenomena as the Eastern Question,[37] which pitted England and Russia against one another for greater influence in the weakening Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century these concerns have not diminished but have shifted emphasis and focus in terms of the particular powers and issues involved.[38]

UNITED KINGDOM

British interest in the Middle East developed during the reign of Elizabeth I but remained almost exclusively commercial until the Napoleonic era. In the nineteenth century a changing emphasis in trade, an expanding empire, and a shifting European balance of power led Britain to support the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a means of blocking Russian egress into the Mediterranean. Britain's primary interest was to protect its empire and the imperial line to the East and thus a policy seeking extended control in the Middle East was adopted. During the latter part of the nineteenth century England developed and expanded its control over much of the "lifeline-to-empire" stretching from Gibraltar to India and the East. By the time British control of Egypt was secured in the latter nineteenth century, Britain had become the strongest power in the Middle East.

With the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after WWI, Britain obtained mandates over Iraq and Palestine, retained effective influence in Egypt, controlled the Suez Canal zone, had protectorate treaties with numerous dependencies on the Arabian Peninsula, and maintained the links in the empire chain to India and the East. In the interwar period the UK was faced with rising Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East and increasing Zionist activity

in Palestine. Following WWII the UK gradually withdrew from its position as a major regional power and, following the Suez Crisis of 1956, the tempo of this process was significantly stepped up.

Despite the continuing decline of its presence and power and the announced withdrawal "East of Suez" by the end of 1971, Britain still has interests in the Middle East.[39] These include access to transportation and communications routes, investment in and the consumption of Middle East oil, political-military concerns by virtue of membership in CENTO and NATO, diminishing commitments to various territories and dependencies, and a residual concern with bases in or near the Middle East.[40]

Transportation and communications links are important as the Suez Canal remains the shortest and fastest West-East link for the British Navy. Trade between Britain and the Middle East comprises less than 10 percent of Britain's total external trade, but more than 20 percent of its foreign trade utilizes the Suez Canal as a part of its sea transport route[41] (see Tables 12 and 35). Similarly, overflight rights will retain significance in maintaining Britain's defense commitments East of Suez and particularly in the Persian Gulf area until withdrawal is complete. Britain is also concerned with Soviet and Chinese Communist activities in the Middle East that might endanger British interests.

Britain's desire to preserve its commercial interests in the region should not be minimized. British interests in oil both as a consumer and investor are perhaps primary—Britain is a large consumer of energy, a significant part of which is from imported oil (see Table 18). British companies control about one-third of Middle East oil production (see Table 20) and the extent of British investment in the area's oil industry is correspondingly large.[42] The income from these investments (i.e., the production, refining, distribution, and marketing of Middle East oil) (see Table 21) is a significant factor in the British balance of payments. An important corollary of these activities is that several Middle Eastern oil-producing states maintain large deposits of sterling reserves in London (see Table 36) and any sudden shift in these funds would deleteriously affect the British pound.[43] The extent of participation of the British tanker fleet in Middle East oil transport contributes to British interests in the oil industry in the Middle East (see Table 11).

FRANCE

France has perhaps the longest history of interest in the Middle East of any outside power concerned with the area. France was involved in the Crusades, at which time it began to establish a commercial and cultural presence in the area. This presence was formalized by the Treaty of Friendship and Commerce[44] of 1535 between France and the Ottoman Empire under which France received important commercial rights and capitulations. From that treaty until the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798, French policy in the Middle East revolved about the principles of friendship with the Ottoman Empire and protection of Christian holy places. The Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 signaled the end of the policy of friendship with the Ottoman Empire,[45] inaugurated British-French competition in the Middle East, and served as a catalyst for modern Arab nationalism.

After WWI France received a mandate over Syria and Lebanon that accorded it a political interest in the region during the interwar period. With the independence of Syria and Lebanon in the 1940's the French political foothold in the area all but disappeared. French interests in the Middle East in the post-WWII period have revolved around commercial and cultural connections emphasizing concern for communications and transportation lines, securing and maintaining access to oil, and ensuring the absence of hostile domination of the area. Political concerns have become more pronounced during de Gaulle's tenure and have particularly involved the Algerian question and the Arab-Israeli dispute.

French commitments East of Suez are few in number and thus the importance of the Middle East as a strategic transit route is limited. However, in the general area of the Indian Ocean, French dependencies include the Overseas Department of Reunion, the Overseas Territories of French Somaliland (Afar and Issa Territory) and the Comoro Archipelago, as well as several Pacific Ocean Territories. France also has a bilateral defense treaty with Malagasy Republic, and French military units are stationed in the Indian Ocean area.[46] Economic and military relations with the territories are facilitated by the use of Middle Eastern transit routes, but France has no colonies, territories, bases, or defense commitments in the Middle East proper.

French trade with the Middle East (see Table 37) accounts for a small percentage of its total world trade. However, it has an interest in Middle East oil as France obtains much of its crude oil from the Middle East (see Table 18). French imports of Saharan oil will continue to rise, and,to a growing extent, replace oil from the Middle East. French companies have a share in Middle East oil production though, unlike Britain, financial ties with the Middle East hardly exist in areas other than investment in the oil industry (see Table 20). About 4.5 percent of the world tanker fleet sails under the French flag (see Tables 11 and 12) and France thus has an interest in the flow of Middle East oil and a growing concern over the structure of the area's oil industry.

As a member of the Western community France has supported the notion of avoiding conflict in the area as well as hostile domination. However, an important qualification is that France views its interest in the area somewhat apart from those of other members of the Western alliance and sees the area as one in which it might increase its prestige in a bid to strengthen its "third world" role and possibly become a "balancer" between East and West—a "third force" alternative.

Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, French policy in the Middle East has emphasized a shift in direction that had its origins before the conflict. Although before the war France had close relations with Israel, most obviously evidenced by the supply of military equipment to Israel, de Gaulle had been actively engaged in developing relations with the Arab states. Since the war France has moved away from close relations with Israel by declining to deliver aircraft already contracted and paid for by Israel and by partially supporting the Arab position. This is likely to have little effect on French commercial and cultural relations with Israel. In the post-1967-war period France has strengthened relations with the Arab states primarily through verbal support of their aims, agreement to supply military equipment, and efforts to secure greater participation in the oil industry. This should be seen as part of de Gaulle's search for "grandeur."[47] DeGaulle seems to believe he can expand French commercial interests as well as political influence in the individual Arab states.

WEST GERMANY

German financial involvement in the Ottoman bankruptcy of 1881 and the Ottoman Empire's concession of railroad rights to a German syndicate (the Anatolian Railway Company) marked the entrance of Germany into the Middle East in the late nineteenth century. German success in obtaining the railway concession and the subsequent growth of German prestige, especially in Anatolia, created friction between Germany on the one hand and Britain, France, and Russia on the other. Germany's intrusion into the area, highlighted by the Kaiser's visit to the Middle East in 1898, contributed to the tension that preceded and helped precipitate WWI. A high point in German–Middle East relationships was reached with the alliance between Turkey and Germany during WWI.

German interwar activity in the Middle East[48] was essentially limited to an attempt to gain influence in Iran. The increase in German influence in Iran during this period is attributable primarily to Reza Shah's attempt to use relations with Germany to strike a foreign policy balance in dealings with Britain and the Soviet Union. Although the relationship brought increased trade between the two states, the advent of WWII and the abdication of Reza Shah marked the curtailment of Iranian-German relations.

West Germany's Middle Eastern interests today are essentially commercial and revolve around trade and the oil resources of that region (see Tables 18 and 38). West Germany has sought to develop and secure trade relations and to achieve expanded access to the raw materials of the Middle East. Important political concerns are the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine[49] with regard to the Arab world and the moral-political relation with Israel. This relationship involves a perceived German moral obligation to Israel, which has been implemented by some $1 billion in reparations by West Germany to Israel and Israeli nationals.[50]

EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY

The members of the EEC (or Common Market)[51] maintain an interest in the Middle East because of its oil resources (see Tables 18–20), its potential for trade (see Tables 37–42), and its communications facilities. Two questions arise in the implementation of these interests: the effect of the Common Market on the economies of Middle Eastern states and the potential effect of Middle Eastern commodity restrictions on the development of the EEC. The exact nature of this relationship is not yet determinable but two factors are apparent—Middle East oil is critical to the future development of the EEC program, and Iran, Israel, and Turkey, the three Middle East states affected most by the establishment of the EEC, have reached some accommodation with the EEC.[52]

JAPAN

Japan's relatively recent interests are significant, and Japan is gradually increasing its participation in the affairs of the region, particularly in commerce (see Table 43). These interests are primarily in the Middle East oil

industry from which Japan secures approximately 90 percent of its growing oil requirements (see Tables 10, 18, and 29). This need for oil leads to a direct interest in the prevention of regional conflict or hostile domination that might endanger these supplies or impede access to them.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

China is the most recent of the major powers to become involved in the area,and its concerns appear to be, at best, peripheral to its vital national interest. In part, this peripheral interest is related to its limited political, economic, and military capabilities vis-à-vis the Middle East. China does not participate in the Middle East oil industry, though in the future it is conceivable that a need for oil as an important source of energy for an industrializing China will be evidenced. The location of the Middle East, far from China, reduces its value as a territorial acquisition for strategic purposes. Thus Chinese activities in the region can be related to a general desire to promote support for its position and policies in the developing world, to spread Chinese influence, and to reduce US and USSR control in the region without coming into direct confrontation with those superpowers. In this regard it has been interested in stirring up the Middle East cauldron and exploiting regional disputes. China has urged a strong anti-West and anti-imperialist line in the Middle East and has attacked the Soviet Union for its laxity in this realm.[53] Chinese actions in support of its hard-line policy have resulted in improving relations with the radical Syrian regime,[54] supplying military equipment and training for the Palestine Liberation Organization–Palestine Liberation Army, propaganda broadcasting, and the dissemination of Chinese publications throughout the area. China maintains diplomatic and commercial contacts with several Middle Eastern states but has emphasized its activities in Yemen (see Tables 44 and 45). China signed a treaty of friendship with Yemen in January 1958 and in April of that year agreed to build a highway between its two principal cities, Sana and Hodeida. Although a comparatively modest affair, the Chinese presence in Yemen represented one of its few tangible footholds in the Arab states and one that it has been anxious to preserve. China recognized the republican government of Yemen soon after its establishment and in June 1964 signed a treaty of friendship with the Yemeni Arab Republic.

SOVIET UNION

Russian interest in the Middle East may be traced to the Byzantine period though only in the seventeenth century did it begin to assert this interest that included controlling the Turkish Straits to provide access to the Mediterranean, gaining warm-water ports on the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, and securing its southern borders against hostile domination.

From the late seventeenth century through the eighteenth century, Russia in its effort to reach the Black Sea was in contention with the Turks. This struggle culminated in the signing of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji in 1774,

by which Russia gained direct access to the Black Sea, commercial rights in Ottoman territory, religious rights with respect to holy places, and the right to establish a protectorate over the Christian population of Moldavia and Wallachia. Its interest in territorial expansion at the expense of the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created friction between Russia and other European powers, particularly Britain and France. Attempts by Russia to secure its border with Persia resulted in increasingly poor relations with that empire and eventually brought it into conflict with Great Britain which feared Russian encroachment in India. At the beginning of the twentieth century this confrontation was abated by the jointly perceived German threat, and the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which divided Persia into three spheres of influence—a northern Russian sphere, a southwestern neutral zone, and a southeastern British zone—resulted.

Although Russian interest was concentrated in what is now the Northern Tier, there was some interest in the area to the south,and Russia sought control of the holy places in Palestine. An immediate cause of the Crimean War was Franco-Russian rivalry over these holy places.

Soviet interests reflect these traditional Russian concerns. The Soviets maintain an interest in access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish Straits, in access to warm-water ports, and in the security of its southern borders. Additionally, in its role as a superpower engaged in a cold war with the West the Soviet Union must consider its interests and security in a global context. In this regard denying the Middle East's vital transportation, communications, and oil facilities to the West remains a major objective. However, unlike the Western powers, the Soviet Union does not have substantial financial or commercial investments in the Middle East, though it has extended aid to this area and trades with it on an increasing scale The Soviets have no legitimate requirement for Middle East oil, in part because of significant oil strikes in the Soviet Union.[55] The communications and transportation links of the Middle East, such as Suez, are of importance for such efforts as supplying North Vietnam, but there are no commitments East of Suez that require constant transit through the Middle East. A presence in the area would be helpful in implementing its program in Africa and in lending credibility to its verbal support for wars of national liberation.

Soviet policies in support of its Middle East interests have not always been active. Indeed, during much of the first half of the twentieth century only occasional attempts were made to secure and maintain a foothold in the area. These attempts were sporadic and restricted largely to the Northern Tier, particularly Turkey and Iran.[56] They involved limited use of diplomatic, military, economic, and/or ideological instruments according to the opportunities of the moment. The first Soviet attempts after the 1917 revolution were both diplomatic and ideological. At the Congress of the Peoples of the East, held in Baku in September 1920 under the auspices of the Communist International, Russia put forward the slogan of liberation of colonial and semicolonial peoples from imperialist domination. The Comintern continuously harped on this theme and at its Sixth Congress (1928) prepared detailed programs dealing with this subject.

Diplomatic actions were synchronized with this ideological offensive. In 1921 the Soviet Union concluded treaties with Turkey,[57] Iran,[58] and Afghanistan. These treaties were similar in their opposition to colonialism and in their use

of anti-imperialist phraseology. Although new agreements were reached with Turkey and Iran in 1925 and 1927 respectively, relations between the Soviet Union and its southern neighbors rapidly declined. By 1937 they had deteriorated to the point where the Saadabad Pact, entered into by Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, was widely interpreted as being directed against the Soviet Union.[59]

During the interwar period the Soviet Union acted primarily through the Comintern and the small, rather inefficient Communist Parties in the Arab states and Palestine in its relations with the Middle East. The official Communist Party line was to favor Arab nationalism and to side with it against Zionism. Zionism, officially described as a capitalist ideology, was considered an instrument of British imperialism and was opposed both in Palestine and Russia. Despite this view the Soviets sponsored a Communist Party among the Jews of Palestine.

Following WWII Soviet activity increased in support of its interests. After initial overtures in the Northern Tier were thwarted, primarily by effective US counteractions, Moscow concentrated on the Arab East and supported Arab independence movements and their demands for withdrawal of Western troops from the area in 1946 and early 1947. In late 1947 and in 1948 Soviet support was given to Zionist aspirations for the establishment and consolidation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In November 1947 the Soviet Union backed the majority plan of UNSCOP that called for the partition of Palestine and, in essence, provided for the establishment of the State of Israel. The Soviet Union accorded de jure recognition to Israel shortly after its independence and supported its applications for membership in the UN.[60] At the same time the Soviets were increasingly critical of the Arab League, which they described as a British instrument aimed against the national-liberation movements in the Middle East and a "reactionary block."[61] In 1949 Soviet policy began shifting toward the position that its objectives in the Middle East could not be achieved by supporting Israel. From 1949 to1953 Moscow's position with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict was formally neutral, though characterized by a continuous deterioration in Soviet-Israeli relations and a corresponding improvement in relations with the Arab states. The next two years, 1953 to 1955, saw Moscow shift to a cautious pro-Arab stand that in 1955 became a policy of full diplomatic support for the Arabs in their anti-Israel and anti-West positions.

The year 1955 was an important milestone in Soviet relations with the Middle East for it signaled the beginning of a new approach in Soviet attempts to secure influence in the area. This was made possible by the interaction of several factors, all of which came to the fore at this time. Stalin and the essentially inflexible Stalinist approach to foreign affairs were no longer major operating factors affecting Soviet external relations. The Eastern European and Communist Chinese buffers for the Soviet state had apparently been secured. The Soviet economy had recovered significantly from the setbacks resulting from WWII, and the Soviet Union was developing as an industrial state. A comprehensive review of Soviet foreign policy undertaken in April 1955 concluded that previous approaches to the Middle East had been lacking in concrete accomplishment. An obvious corollary was that a new approach was required. At the same time developments in the Middle East contributed to this chain of events. Particularly noteworthy were the emergence of Arab nationalism and consummation of the Baghdad Pact. The growth of Arab nationalism was not accompanied

by any growth of Arab unity and was generally characterized by an anti-Western attitude thereby providing fertile ground for Soviet exploitation. Additionally the bitter Arab reaction to the establishment of the Baghdad Pact led to increased resentment against the West, in particular the US and Britain.

The conclusion of the Baghdad Pact seemingly secured the Northern Tier against Soviet encroachment but did not prevent Soviet penetration into the Middle East. It led to a change in Soviet tactics centering on the decision to bypass the Pact area and to concentrate on the Arab core of the Middle East. This approach was reflected in increased political, military, economic, and cultural ties between the Soviet Bloc and the Arab world. A significant first step was the conclusion of the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal in the fall of 1955.[62] The major emphasis was on an economic program of aid and trade, which has continued as the main operational technique for the Soviet Union in the Middle East since 1955.[63]

The Soviet aid program in the Middle East has consisted of both grants and credits, with emphasis on the latter (see Table 46). In the period between 1954 and 1966 grants and credits to the Middle East totaled approximately $2.15 billion out of a total of $5.9 billion to all the developing world. Egypt received and continues to receive the largest share amounting to approximately 50 percent of the Middle East total—much of this allocated for the Aswan Dam project and related items. The aid program has been utilized as part of a coordinated effort. Offers of development credits, technical assistance, military assistance, and outright grants as well as proposals for increased trade have been combined with political, psychological, propaganda, cultural, military, and subversive activities. These have been supplemented by high-level contacts with political leaders, red-carpet treatment for visiting Arab world dignitaries, the training of students in Soviet Bloc universities, and other programs of a similar variety.

In the period since 1955 Soviet Middle Eastern policy has been based on exploitation of Arab anti-Western feeling, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and various inter-Arab conflicts. This has involved an effort to prevent alleviation of tension and armed clashes while engaging in a conscious attempt to avoid escalation of local conflicts to the level of USSR-US confrontation.

The Soviet Middle Eastern initiative has achieved tangible results. Some Arab states, e.g., Egypt and Syria, depend on the Soviet Bloc for military supplies and, to a lesser extent, training (see Tables 30 to 34). Trade between the Soviet Bloc and the Arab states is measured in millions of dollars per year (see Tables 47 and 48). There is a significant cultural and educational exchange program. In part as a reflection of the value of achievements to date, the aid and trade offensive is continuing at a rather constant level although there have been occasional reductions. Following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war the size of the program significantly increased. Soviet accomplishments in the political realm are somewhat more difficult to delineate. The Middle East still has no legal Communist Party (except for the two Communist Parties of Israel that participate to a minor degree in the political affairs in that state), nor any local communist movement with a significant political role.[64] In the period immediately following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war the Soviet position in the area improved in terms of a Russian naval presence in the Mediterranean and access to naval and port facilities (see Table 13). The long-range political results of the 1967 conflict are as yet unknown though Soviet interests in the Middle East will be

maintained and increased activity in their support is likely. The Soviet Union has indicated no slackening of its interest in the region and has, at least temporarily, increased its efforts to consolidate its immediate post-1967-war position. The Soviets have pressed demands on the weakened Egyptian, Yemeni, and Syrian regimes for increased naval facilities in those states.[65]

THE US

Until WWI US interests in the Middle East were highly circumscribed and primarily private. Missionaries and educators were active in the area and religious, philanthropic, medical, and educational endeavors constituted the largest extent of US activities. Official US actions were generally limited to the protection of American citizens and some concern for US commercial interests. There was no US "policy" in the region and the government took no stand on political matters.[66]

In the period between WWI and WWII US activities showed a slight yet significant shift with regard to the Middle East.[67] It should be emphasized, however, that this increased activity was not yet a component of a US Middle East policy but consisted instead of either pious pronouncements of the Congress or the Executive or the actions of private groups dealing with specific and limited questions concerning only parts of the area. No comprehensive policy that included all factors of Middle Eastern politics had yet been formulated. US concern was limited to the protection of cultural and commercial interests; care was taken to avoid becoming involved in political problems that might require the assumption of political responsibilities. Only on the Palestine question did the US approximate political commitment and even pronouncements dealing with that area were essentially vague notions concerning a Jewish homeland in Palestine.[68] Neither the Congress nor the Executive was prepared to commit the US to action in behalf of those statements.

WWII brought about a change in US attitudes and the US became actively involved in the Middle East. During the war US troops were stationed in the area; air bases and supply depots were established; and transportation and communications links were set up. The strategic value of the area became obvious, and increased US interest in Middle East oil added to the area's importance in American eyes. At the same time US support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine became more pressing as a result of Hitler's policies in Europe. After the war the attainment of superpower status by the US contributed to its need to formulate a policy for the Middle East. During the immediate postwar period there was an increasing awareness that the US would have to adopt a comprehensive Middle East policy.

The basic and immediate component of US postwar Middle East policy was to prevent hostile, particularly Soviet, domination of the region. That policy was tested initially in Turkey, Iran, and Greece. The US countered the Soviet threat in Iran by the use of political pressure and by entering into bilateral arrangements. In the case of both Turkey and Greece, the US responded to the Soviet challenge with the Truman Doctrine,[69] which enunciated the US determination to protect the Northern Tier from Soviet encroachment. Despite the early pronouncement of the Doctrine, no Palestine policy or overall Middle East policy was elaborated for several years[70].

The US assumed that economic and military assistance to the Northern Tier would serve to block Soviet penetration into the Arab Middle East. However, the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab conflicts provided the basis for a new Soviet approach to the Arab East that began in earnest in the fall of 1955 with the conclusion of the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian arms deal. To coincide with its change in target states (from the Northern Tier to the Arab states) the Soviet Union changed its tactics from the overt military sphere to political, cultural, and economic areas. Military assistance coupled with trade and aid constituted the core of the effort. Increasing Soviet presence in the Middle East after the Suez crisis brought about a US reaction in the form of the Eisenhower Doctrine,[71] which sought to safeguard Middle Eastern states from communist-dominated or -controlled states.

US policy with regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute took shape after the establishment of Israel and the cessation of Arab-Israeli hostilities by the 1949 armistice agreements. The US adopted, and has since maintained, the position that termination of the Arab-Israeli dispute by peaceful means is necessary to ensure the peace and stability of the region and to secure other US interests in the Middle East.[72] The US has also sought friendship with both Israel and the Arab states[73] though it has been realized that this could be fully implemented only when the two sides were on less belligerent terms.

US efforts to achieve nonbelligerency have been channeled in part through the UN and its Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) of which the US is a member.[74] The US has continued to operate under the assumption that PCC-sponsored, high-level "quiet talks" between the Arab states and Israel are a useful means to narrow the differences between the parties to the dispute. Other specific procedures have also been employed to this end, including proposals on the refugee problem and the utilization of the waters of the Jordan River.

Supplementing these efforts has been a program of arms control and of economic and technical aid designed to prevent intensification of the conflict. The earliest articulation of the arms-control concept was the establishment of an arms embargo to combatants during the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-1949.[75] After that war the embargo approach to arms control was no longer fully effective and thus a new procedure to prevent an arms race was formulated in the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 50 in which the US, the UK, and France proclaimed their opposition to the development of an arms race between Israel and the Arab states. They stated their determination to consider future applications for arms from the states of the area on the principle that arms would be supplied if necessary "for the purposes of assuring their [Israel and the Arab States] internal security and their legitimate self-defense and to permit them to play their part in the defense of the area as a whole."[76] This has been continuously reaffirmed by the US though without the official concurrence of the other powers[77] (see Table 49).

The US has granted economic and technical assistance to Israel and Arab states[78] and has promoted projects designed to develop Middle Eastern resources in a manner beneficial to all the states of the area (see Table 50). At the basis of this program of economic and technical assistance lies the assumption that instability and vulnerability to communist pressure could be best thwarted through economic development and amelioration of the conditions of the peoples involved. An extension of this point is the argument that the security of the US

and the peace of the world depend not only on the security but also on the well-being of all states.[79] These programs also act as a counter to the Soviet trade and aid offensive and serve a propaganda purpose of increasing US prestige in the area. An additional factor is the hope that such aid might be instrumental in the achievement of conditions conducive to a rapprochement between Israel and the Arab states.[80]

Thus, in the period since WWII the US has adopted essentially a twofold approach to the Middle East: it has opposed the Soviet threat in the Northern Tier through economic and military assistance to those states, and it has sought peace and stability through termination of the Arab-Israeli dispute that has been a major obstacle to that end. During the late 1950's support of modernization became a major segment of the program. The resulting approach could be characterized as one of "security and stability with change,"[81] and this formed the core of US Middle East policy until the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and has continued since.

The primary objective of the US in the Middle East remains the prevention of conflict that might involve the US directly or indirectly.[82] To forestall hostile domination of the region; ensure US and Allied access to Middle East communications facilities, resources,[83] and strategic positions (see Table 13); and provide for profitable US investment[84] (see Tables 51 to 53) are supporting US objectives in the Middle East.[85] Most importantly this involves the uninterrupted flow at reasonable prices of Middle East oil to Western Europe (for economic and military purposes) and unimpeded transit through the Suez Canal. There is also an interest in ensuring access to Middle Eastern markets (see Table 54) and the free and safe entry into the area for US nationals. To these ends the US has sought to terminate the various conflicts in the region, to achieve political stability, and to promote efforts aimed at modernization.[86] These approaches are now to some extent subsumed under President Johnson's June 1967 Five Principles of Peace: "first, the recognized right of national life; second, justice for the refugees; third, innocent maritime passage; fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all."[87]

TABLE 1

Suez Canal: Number of Transits and Net Tonnage[a]

Year	Number of transits	Net tonnage, thous of tons	Year	Number of transits	Net tonnage, thous of tons
1926	4,980	26,060	1946	5,057	32,732
1927	5,545	28,962	1947	5,972	36,577
1928	6,084	31,906	1948	8,686	55,081
1929	6,274	33,466	1949	10,420	68,811
1930	5,761	31,669	1950	11,751	81,796
1931	5,366	30,028	1951	11,694	80,356
1932	5,032	28,340	1952	12,168	86,137
1933	5,423	30,677	1953	12,731	92,905
1934	5,663	31,751	1954	13,215	102,494
1935	5,992	32,811	1955	14,666	115,756
1936	5,877	32,379	1956	13,291	107,006
1937	6,635	36,491	1957	10,958	89,911
1938	6,171	34,418	1958	17,842	154,479
1939	5,277	29,573	1959	17,731	163,386
1940	2,589	13,536	1960	18,734	185,322
1941	1,804	8,263	1961	18,148	187,059
1942	1,646	7,028	1962	18,518	197,837
1943	2,262	11,274	1963	19,146	210,498
1944	3,320	18,125	1964	19,943	227,991
1945	4,206	25,065	1965	20,289	246,817

[a]From United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal Report 1965.

TABLE 2

Suez Canal: Comparison of Alternate Routes[a]

Sea routes	Miles via Suez	Miles around Cape of Good Hope	Round trip, days[b]		Number of round trips per year[c]	
			Suez	Cape	Suez	Cape
London to Persian Gulf[d]	6,400	11,300	37	65	9	5⅓
London to Mombasa	6,014	8,675	30	43	6	5
London to Bombay	6,260	10,720	31	54	6	4⅓
London to Calcutta	7,933	11,450	40	57	5	4
London to Colombo	6,702	10,350	34	52	5⅓	4½
London to Singapore	8,240	11,575	41	58	5	4
London to Penang	7,950	11,285	40	56	5	4¼
London to Sydney, Australia	11,630	12,450	58	62	4	4
London to Wellington, NZ	12,650	13,250	63	66	4	3¾
London to Hong Kong	9,680	13,015	48	65	4⅔	3¾
Netherlands to Indonesia	8,502	11,150	43	56	5	4½
Naples to Nasawa, Eritrea	2,178	10,850	11	54	9	4½

[a]From The Economist, 4 Aug 56, p 149.
[b]Steaming time at 16½ knots, i.e., fast freighter.
[c]Includes 30 days on each trip for loading and discharging.
[d]Assuming tanker speed 14½ knots and 4 days of loading and discharging.

TABLE 3

Suez Canal: Crude-Oil Traffic Northward, 1965[a]

(In thousands of tons)

Loading area	Destination										Total
	Italy	France	UK	Holland	Belgium	West Germany	US	Spain and Canary Islands	Denmark	Others	
Kuwait	27,418	9,800	10,825	4,757	3186	594	2388	1303	923	478	61,672
Iran	3,925	6,831	6,428	5,002	5678	4825	2641	98	340	2,815	38,583
Saudi Arabia	6,787	6,622	3,166	2,748	891	2088	1045	2394	748	4,289	30,778
Iraq	666	1,833	80	152	109	45	84	—	—	2,167	5,136
Qatar	217	1,273	89	255	—	—	—	—	—	976	2,810
UAR	1,106	—	31	47	108	—	129	145	—	346	1,912
Others	813	—	651	827	—	—	35	—	390	57	2,773
Total	40,932	26,359	21,270	13,788	9972	7552	6322	3940	2401	11,128	143,664

[a]From United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal Report 1965.

TABLE 4

Suez Canal: Refined-Oil-Products Traffic Northward, 1965[a]

(In thousands of tons)

Loading area	Destination											Total
	UK	Holland	Sweden	Denmark	Greece	Spain and Canary Islands	UAR	Italy	Belgium	US	Others	
Bahrain	188	104	712	805	27	160	—	40	82	17	163	2296
Aden	1089	53	120	66	17	146	—	33	82	—	605	2211
Kuwait	473	732	19	35	121	131	16	79	69	35	201	1911
UAR	43	149	—	—	631	44	490	206	17	31	53	1664
Iran	457	269	35	—	20	100	—	12	—	9	181	1083
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—	—	47	44	36	47	—	19	16	209
Others	323	208	26	—	—	—	—	—	—	33	31	621
Total	2573	1515	912	904	863	625	542	417	250	144	1250	9995

[a]From United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal Report 1965.

TABLE 5

Suez Canal: Crude- and Refined-Oil Traffic Southward, 1965[a]

(In thousands of tons)

Loading area	Destination														Total	
	Japan		India		Pakistan		Ceylon		China		Siberia		Others			
	Crude	Refined	Crude	Refined	Crude	Refined	Crude	Refined	Crude	Refined	Crude	Refined	Crude	Refined	Crude	Refined
USSR	1613	1359	25	1362	—	—	—	359	—	—	—	130	131	299	1769	3509
Rumania	194	595	—	64	—	—	—	74	—	132	—	—	—	38	194	903
Italy	2	2	19	152	—	474	—	24	—	—	—	—	—	135	21	787
Albania	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	127	—	—	—	—	—	127	—
Others	—	35	1	52	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	16	28	197	29	300
Total	1809	1991	45	1630	—	474	—	457	127	132	—	146	159	669	2140	5499

[a]From United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal Report 1965.

TABLE 6

Suez Canal: Main Northbound Goods Traffic[a]

(In thousands of tons)

Year	Petroleum products	Cereals	Ores and metals	Oil seeds	Textile fibers, raw	Others	Total
1926	3,019	2091	1448	2841	1480	4,726	15,605
1927	3,158	3417	1686	3139	1864	5,177	18,441
1928	3,342	3186	1932	4234	1956	6,009	20,659
1929	3,714	2610	2189	4688	2024	6,395	21,620
1930	4,062	2154	1837	3577	1745	5,702	19,077
1931	3,310	2840	1179	3847	1520	5,259	17,955
1932	3,823	2441	933	3522	1304	5,295	17,318
1933	4,933	2477	1009	4024	1769	5,500	19,712
1934	5,136	2760	1245	3807	1619	5,897	20,464
1935	4,285	1972	1385	2588	1832	5,342	17,404
1936	4,216	2270	1306	2754	1530	4,651	16,727
1937	5,705	3406	2121	3439	1673	6,275	22,619
1938	5,220	3216	1387	3907	1372	5,909	21,011
1939	4,989	2113	1055	2874	1142	4,988	17,161
1946	8,371	244	1151	499	979	4,687	15,931
1947	13,846	516	1578	920	1068	4,839	22,767
1948	28,937	1910	1405	923	1241	5,237	39,653
1949	36,976	1492	1933	984	1316	5,326	48,027
1950	47,526	2061	2212	1444	1489	5,736	60,468
1951	42,873	3072	2592	2083	1549	7,164	59,333
1952	45,933	1824	3731	1531	1409	7,019	61,447
1953	49,420	2068	5049	1734	1817	7,793	67,881
1954	56,978	2189	4552	1765	1629	7,398	74,511
1955	66,893	2488	5300	1803	1744	9,198	87,426
1956	65,777	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	17,099	82,876
1957	54,051	1146	4344	1153	999	5,526	67,219
1958	94,401	1681	5602	1594	1766	9,386	114,430
1959	98,721	2991	5671	1991	1953	10,422	121,749
1960	114,419	2673	8257	1883	1808	10,590	139,630
1961	114,276	3247	7994	1472	1635	10,975	139,599
1962	124,639	3035	6938	1388	1866	13,324	151,190
1963	133,019	2303	6317	1552	1886	14,405	159,482
1964	144,661	2601	6745	1587	1918	14,951	172,463
1965	155,086	2665	7116	1367	1861	15,346	183,441

[a]From United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal Report 1965, p 162.

[b]Cannot be classified due to absence of the Captains' Declarations of July 1956.

TABLE 7

Suez Canal: Main Southbound Goods Traffic[a]

(In thousands of tons)

Year	Petroleum products	Cement	Fertilizers	Coal and coke	Railway stock	Fabricated metals	Wood pulp and paper	Salt	Cereals and derivatives	Others	Total
1926	297	393	462	294	628	2450	322	418	—	4,540	9,804
1927	347	545	509	667	900	2537	294	534	—	4,755	11,082
1928	346	700	752	606	865	2986	343	581	—	4,784	11,963
1929	350	774	845	771	638	3588	431	481	—	5,018	12,896
1930	398	552	679	450	425	2613	368	432	4	3,513	9,434
1931	367	343	702	296	229	1905	387	258	30	2,860	7,377
1932	518	270	463	178	126	1738	430	256	7	2,328	6,314
1933	627	313	462	177	160	2241	443	239	207	2,334	7,203
1934	635	402	464	144	437	2316	450	348	344	2,444	7,984
1935	759	524	502	240	275	2590	514	323	270	2,927	8,924
1936	707	571	563	216	244	2542	530	324	63	3,069	8,829
1937	360	582	879	473	321	2890	690	408	67	3,487	10,157
1938	283	561	655	208	255	1954	390	349	73	3,040	7,768
1939	229	586	584	273	193	1686	362	583	105	2,916	7,517
1946	73	404	515	18	114	668	178	131	1236	2,658	5,995
1947	94	599	508	45	123	1210	254	655	1313	3,020	7,821
1948	70	1056	367	191	198	1682	334	951	1132	3,735	9,716
1949	166	1326	673	161	329	2642	452	1136	1668	4,475	13,028
1950	111	1110	1089	549	377	2725	450	161	779	4,790	12,141
1951	1931	1207	1085	328	308	2788	510	835	2215	6,213	17,420
1952	6415	1701	1593	406	304	2529	441	393	2176	6,043	22,001
1953	7231	1587	2065	72	268	3052	608	406	1468	5,761	22,518
1954	6084	1990	2089	75	385	3169	568	470	504	7,036	22,370
1955	1905	2683	2454	116	467	3759	611	497	489	7,101	20,082
1956	1755	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	—[b]	16,352	18,107
1957	847	1285	1935	61	426	3514	367	182	1046	4,441	14,104
1958	2376	1379	3685	149	760	5331	506	404	3937	6,416	24,943
1959	2494	1684	3905	225	376	5484	620	530	3870	7,317	26,505
1960	3007	1131	4002	458	354	5644	649	679	4686	8,643	29,253
1961	6300	1017	4279	373	442	4423	630	474	3979	10,878	32,795
1962	5543	1311	3663	313	455	3828	638	417	4758	10,281	31,207
1963	5010	1383	4647	447	292	4324	665	406	5996	10,880	34,050
1964	6136	1760	3897	237	135	5096	764	606	8190	11,697	38,518
1965	7908	1215	5168	265	168	4727	681	544	8042	13,283	42,001

[a]From United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal Report 1965, p 161.

[b]Cannot be classified due to absence of the Captains' Declarations of July 1956.

TABLE 8

Suez Canal: Traffic, 1957–1966[a]

Year	Ships		Merchandise, thous of tons		Number of passengers	Total transit receipts, thous of £
	Number	Net tonnage, thous of tons	Northbound	Southbound		
1957[b]	10,958	89,911	67,219	14,104	188,361	24,480
1958	17,842	154,479	114,430	24,943	342,404	42,141
1959	17,731	163,386	121,749	20,505	326,446	44,502
1960	18,734	185,322	139,630	29,253	366,562	50,408
1961	18,148	187,059	139,599	32,795	322,842	51,088
1962	18,518	197,837	151,190	31,207	269,685	53,958
1963	19,146	210,498	159,482	34,050	297,955	71,294
1964	19,943	227,911	172,463	38,518	269,579	77,697
1965	20,289	246,817	183,441	42,001	291,085	85,792
1966	21,250	274,250	194,168	47,725	299,557	na[c]

[a]From The Middle East and North Africa 1966–67, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1966, 13th ed, p 88, and The Middle East and North Africa 1967–68, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1967, 14th ed, p 58.

[b]April through December.

[c]Not available.

TABLE 9

Suez Canal: Traffic Pattern, 1965[a]

Flag	Ship traffic					Goods		
	Class of vessel	Number		Net tonnage, thous of tons		Commodities	Tonnage, thous of tons	
		1965	Difference from 1964	1965	Difference from 1964		1965	Difference from 1964
Liberia	Tanker	2042	+248	46,126	+10,833	Northbound oil	40,228	+9845
	Other	363	+ 5	2,264	+ 75	Other commodities	3,638	- 528
	Total	2405	+253	48,390	+10,908	Total	43,866	+9317
UK	Tanker	1503	-312	26,881	- 3,157	Northbound oil	22,152	-4373
	Other	2021	+ 28	14,613	+ 161	Other commodities	12,392	+ 13
	Total	3524	-284	41,494	- 2,996	Total	34,544	-4360
Norway	Tanker	1628	+174	33,852	+ 7,434	Northbound oil	29,333	+6349
	Other	540	+ 27	3,598	+ 261	Other commodities	5,215	+1712
	Total	2168	+201	37,450	+ 7,695	Total	34,548	+8061
France	Tanker	710	- 43	13,255	+ 154	Northbound oil	11,674	- 273
	Other	447	+ 22	2,827	+ 119	Other commodities	2,201	+ 286
	Total	1157	- 21	16,082	+ 273	Total	13,875	+ 13
Italy	Tanker	601	- 83	10,712	- 724	Northbound oil	9,639	- 559
	Other	628	- 34	3,656	- 110	Other commodities	2,867	- 281
	Total	1229	-117	14,368	- 834	Total	12,506	- 840
Greece	Tanker	490	+ 2	7,879	- 375	Northbound oil	6,787	- 544
	Other	883	+106	4,794	+ 321	Other commodities	6,788	+ 212
	Total	1373	+108	12,673	- 54	Total	13,575	- 332
Holland	Tanker	357	- 59	6,104	- 1,374	Northbound oil	5,482	- 840
	Other	539	- 49	3,581	- 373	Other commodities	3,284	- 145
	Total	896	-108	9,685	- 1,747	Total	8,766	- 985
USSR	Tanker	440	+ 95	4,327	+ 1,383	Southbound oil	3,669	+1272
	Other	935	+241	4,292	+ 1,102	Other commodities	5,761	+1749
	Total	1375	+336	8,619	+ 2,485	Total	9,430	+3021
West Germany	Tanker	197	- 29	4,069	- 515	Northbound oil	3,508	- 683
	Other	619	+ 24	4,067	+ 262	Other commodities	3,097	+ 94
	Total	816	- 5	8,136	- 253	Total	6,605	- 589
Panama	Tanker	309	- 59	6,332	+ 640	Northbound oil	4,805	- 816
	Other	276	+ 3	1,026	- 91	Other commodities	1,631	+ 173
	Total	585	- 56	7,358	+ 549	Total	6,436	- 643

[a]From United Arab Republic, Suez Canal Authority, Suez Canal Report 1965, p 120.

TABLE 10

Employment of Tankers, 1963[a]

(Percent of world total)

Voyages to	Voyages from				Total
	US	Caribbean	Middle East	Others	
US	8.0	6.0	4.5	1.0	19.5
Canada	—	1.5	1.5	—	3.0
Other Western Hemisphere countries	—	2.0	3.0	1.5	6.5
Western Europe and North and West Africa	0.5	7.0	31.5	7.5	46.5
Indian Ocean area	—	—	2.0	0.5	2.5
Japan	0.5	0.5	10.5	2.0	13.5
Other Eastern Hemisphere countries	0.5	0.5	6.0	1.5	8.5
Total	9.5	17.5	59.0	14.0	100.0

[a]From Ramadan Ahmed Kamel, "Arab Oil Prices Justice Versus Fact," Paper 2 (A-4), Fifth Arab Petroleum Congress Papers, Cairo, 16–23 Mar 65, p 9.

TABLE 11

World Tanker Fleet by Flag Vessel[a]

(1 Jan 66)

Country of registry	Number	Deadweight, thous of tons	Country of registry	Number	Deadweight, thous of tons
France	157	3,682	Panama	151	4,279
Greece	129	2,970	UK	441	11,562
Italy	143	2,872	US[b]	341	7,561
Japan	236	6,965	USSR[c]	232	3,425
Liberia	534	19,018	Others	661	11,519
Netherlands	90	2,271	Total	3582	89,723
Norway	467	13,599			

[a]From Dept of Commerce, Maritime Administration.

[b]Comprised of ships under general agreement, bareboat charter, and in the custody of Departments of Defense, State, and Interior.

[c]Source material limited and unreliable.

TABLE 12

Suez Canal: Flag Distribution of Net Tonnage[a]

(In thousands of tons)

Country	1964		1965		1966	
	Tankers	All vessels	Tankers	All vessels	Tankers	All vessels
UK	30,032	44,490	26,881	41,494	31,301	43,580
Liberia	35,293	37,482	46,126	48,390	53,260	56,455
Norway	26,418	29,755	33,852	37,450	40,282	43,840
France	13,101	15,809	13,255	16,082	13,730	16,517
Italy	11,436	15,202	10,712	14,368	11,394	15,231
Greece	8,254	12,727	7,879	12,673	6,930	12,552
Netherlands	7,478	11,432	6,104	9,685	5,457	9,106
Germany	4,587	8,389	4,069	8,136	3,825	7,004
US	1,488	7,573	2,168	6,998	1,816	6,686
Sweden	6,279	7,444	5,674	6,862	6,992	8,207
Panama	5,692	6,809	6,332	7,358	6,530	7,762
USSR	2,944	6,134	4,327	8,619	5,335	10,156
Denmark	4,856	6,124	4,668	5,881	5,325	6,768
Others	8,775	18,666	11,148	22,821	13,955	29,486
Total	166,027	227,991	183,195	246,817	206,132	274,250

[a]From The Middle East and North Africa 1966–67, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1966, 13th ed, p 89, and The Middle East and North Africa 1967–68, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1967, 14th ed, p 59.

TABLE 13

Great-Power Bases, Depots, and Ports of Call in the Mediterranean–Middle East Area[a]

Country	Bases, depots, and ports of call
USSR	Training area in Mediterranean Sea off Sicily
	Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria; Soviet port of call
	Naval training area in eastern Mediterranean Sea off Turkish coast
	Training area in eastern Mediterranean Sea near Crete
	Fleet through Bosporus Straits
	UAR, Port Said; port of call
	UAR, Alexandria; port of call
	Yugoslavia, Dalmatian ports
	Main shore base at Odessa on Black Sea
	Air bases in Soviet Armenia
	Latakia, Syria; port of call
	Hodeida, Yemen; modern Soviet-built port; possible port of call
	Port Sudan; potential presence
UK	Aden; British phasing out
	Socotra Island; Indian Ocean; being phased out
	Perim; British phasing out
	Kamaran; British phasing out; Soviets showing interest
	Mukalla; British phasing out
	Malta; base
	Gibraltar; base
	Benghazi, Libya; ground and air staging posts
	Cyprus; two big strategic air bases at Akrotiri and Dekeleia
	Bahrein; sea and air
	Sharja, Trucial Coast; land and air base, to protect Mideast oil
US	Kénitra, Morocco; USN, landing and training rights
	Rota, Spain; naval and airport
	Cádiz, Spain; large naval base
	Torrejón, Spain; air base
	Saragossa, Spain; air base
	Seville, Spain; air base
	Wheelus Air Base, Libya; one of the biggest in Middle East, primarily training in gunnery; down to skeleton forces since June war
	Athens, Greece; landing rights
	Suda, Crete
	Gaeta, Italy; 6th Fleet port of call
	Adana, Turkey; air base
	Izmir; NATO base
	Arbakar, Turkey
	Iran; technicians, and training of Iranian military
	Asmara, Ethiopia; monitoring base, monitoring Soviet and code breaking, satellite tracking station, 4000 Americans
	Naples, Italy; US and NATO naval port of call
France	Mers-el-Kebir, Algeria; huge French naval and air base: President de Gaulle turning over to Algerians who have virtually no navy; frequent Soviet port of call
	Algeria; French have given up their missile and testing sites
	Hammaguir, Algeria; French out, missile and rocket proving ground
	Reggan, Algeria; nuclear test site, French out
	Djibouti, French Somaliland; voted last year to stay with France
	Bizerte, Tunisia; French got out in 1963; naval base and drydock
PRC[b]—Albania	Viona Bay, two installations, submarines and possible missile base

[a]From Christian Science Monitor, 13 Nov 67.
[b]People's Republic of China.

TABLE 14

Production of Middle East Oil[a]

Country	Reserves		Wells		Production		Refining			
	Oil, thous of bbl	Gas, billions of cu ft	Producing, 1 Jul 66	Drilling, 1 Dec 66	Estimated 1966, thous of bbl/day	Percent of change from 1965	Number of operating refineries	Capacity, thous of bbl/day, 1 Jan 67		
								Crude	Cracking	Reforming
Abu Dhabi	12,500,000	7,500	54	5	357.0	26.6	—	—	—	—
Aden	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	175.0	—	14.0
Bahrain	200,000	100	195	1	61.1	7.2	1	205.0	56.0	36.0
Iran	44,200,000	109,500	145	7	2,094.0	11.1	4	514.0	32.0	44.0
Iraq	24,000,000	20,000	98	1	1,382.0	5.8	6	77.9	14.0	8.0
Israel	14,600	70	36	6	4.1	0	1	100.0	12.0	19.0
Jordan	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	7.5	1.4	0.9
Kuwait	68,700,000	40,000	506	4	2,228.0	2.7	2	360.0	—	4.0
Lebanon	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	35.2	—	6.4
Neutral Zone	13,000,000	3,500	413	2	416.7	15.0	1	50.0	—	—
Oman	500,000	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—
Qatar	4,000,000	7,500	66	2	283.0	22.7	1	0.6	—	—
Saudi Arabia	66,000,000	26,400	317	4	2,374.0	17.2	2	285.0	22.0	15.5
Syria	1,500,000	500	—[b]	3	—	—	1	25.0	—	2.0
Turkey	1,000,000	—	142	19	37.2	25.6	3	124.0	10.5	12.3
Total Middle East	235,614,600	215,070	1972	57	9,237.1	10.6	26	1960.2	147.9	162.1
Total World	389,050,372	1,040,807	—	—	32,708.6	8.8	—	—	—	—

[a]From "Worldwide Oil . . . at a Glance," The Oil and Gas J., 26 Dec 66.
[b]Fields shut in—expect to go on production in 1967.

TABLE 15

"Published Proved" Oil Reserves in the Middle East[a]

(In millions of tons)

Country	Year-end				Percent of world total, 1966
	1963	1964	1965	1966	
Iran	5,007	5,143	5,413	6,055	11.4
Iraq	3,421	3,354	3,354	3,287	6.1
Kuwait	8,773	8,650	8,582	9.411	17.7
Neutral Zone	1,460	1,825	1,810	1,781	3.3
Qatar	384	456	391	548	1.0
Saudi Arabia	8,188	8,256	8,188	9,041	17.0
Other	1,348	1,548	1.965	2,282	4.3
Total	28,581	29,232	29,703	32,405	60.8

[a]From The Middle East and North Africa 1966–67, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1966, 13th ed, p 59, and The Middle East and North Africa 1967–68, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1967, 14th ed, p 42.

TABLE 16

Crude-Oil Production in the Middle East[a]

(In thousands of metric tons)

Country	1938	1963	1964	1965	1966
Saudi Arabia	100	81,140	85,720	100,950	119,380
Kuwait	—	97,200	106,390	108,730	114,040
Iran	10,400	72,830	84,250	93.820	105,220
Iraq	4,400	56,670	61,520	64,360	67,950
Kuwait/Saudi Arabia and Neutral Zone	—	16,440	18,900	18,950	21,880
Abu Dhabi	—	2,530	9,000	13,560	17,310
Qatar	—	9,100	10,150	10,890	13,860
Egypt	200	8,850	6,350	6,400	6,590
Bahrain	1,100	2,240	2,450	2,790	3,020
Turkey	—	700	900	1,540	1,880
Israel	—	150	200	200	200
Total	16,200	344,720	385,890	422,190	471,240

[a]From The Middle East and North Africa 1966–67, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1966, 13th ed, p 59, and The Middle East and North Africa 1967–68, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1967, 14th ed, p 42.

TABLE 17

World's Principal Oil Trade[a]

(In thousands of barrels per day)

Shipper	Recipient								Total oil exports
	US	Canada	Others in Western Hemisphere	Western Europe	Africa[b]	Japan	Australasia	Asia	
US[c]	—	50	30	70	10	40	—	—	200
Canada	385	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	385
Venezuela	1405	289	679	662	—	50	5	10	3100
Middle East	320	145	295	4400	500	1650	340	570	8220
Via Mediterranean ports	55	36	—	1000	—	—	—	—	1091
Via Suez	165	73	—	3100	—	—	—	—	3338
Via Cape of Good Hope	—	36	295	300	500	—	—	—	1131
To ports east of Suez	100	—	—	—	—	1650	340	570	2660
Africa[d]	90	35	45	2540	5	5	—	25	2745
Indonesia	60	—	—	35	—	140	100	5	340
USSR	—	5	145	685[e]	50	100	—	65	1050

[a]From "Tankers Move the Oil that Moves the World," Fortune, 1 Sep 67.

[b]Includes all African imports.

[c]Refined products are 98 percent of US exports.

[d]Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria.

[e]No USSR oil goes to the UK.

TABLE 18

Oil Imports from the Middle East, 1961 and 1964[a]

Importer[b]	Year	Total imports	Exporter											
			Iraq		Kuwait[c]		Qatar		Saudi Arabia		Trucial Oman		UAR	
			Amount, thous of metric tons	Percent of total oil imports	Amount, thous of metric tons	Percent of total oil imports	Amount, thous of metric tons	Percent of total oil imports	Amount, thous of metric tons	Percent of total oil imports	Amount, thous of metric tons	Percent of total oil imports	Amount, thous of metric tons	Percent of total oil imports
UK	1961	49,950	6,080	12	24,050	48	700	1	1,840	4	—	—	10	0.02
	1964	58,790	11,300	19	18,400	31	800	1	1,780	3	2490	4	—	—
France	1961	34,750	6,890	20	8,720	25	1570	5	2,340	7	—	—	—	—
	1964	50,160	8,050	16	9,800	20	1310	3	1,900	4	1460	3	—	—
West Germany	1961	27,800	4,160	15	2,200	8	1760	6	3,710	13	—	—	—	—
	1964	50,670	5,300	10	2,800	6	940	2	7,300	14	1460	3	—	—
US	1961	54,150	1,180	2	8,720	16	470	1	3,270	6	—	—	230	0.4
	1964	62,640	—	—	5,900	9	950	2	4,700	8	150	0.2	230	0.4
Japan	1961	33,450	3,090	9	14,400	43	220	1	6,460	19	—	—	—	—
	1964	62,270	2,950	5	27,000	43	380	1	10,650	17	170	0.3	10	0.02
Belgium-Luxembourg	1961	7,560	2,750	36	220	3	—	—	760	10	—	—	—	—
	1964	13,870	2,030	15	1,980	14	70	1	730	5	650	5	—	—
Italy	1961	33,500	8,950	27	9,040	27	—	—	6,240	19	—	—	1355	4
	1964	54,410	7,050	13	21,300	39	50	0.1	9,640	18	390	1	750	>1
Netherlands	1961	19,400	5,440	28	4,850	25	—	—	2,910	15	—	—	—	—
	1964	25,960	5,670	22	5,400	21	870	3	3,670	14	290	1	—	—

[a]From United Nations, Statistical Office, "World Energy Supplies 1961-1964," Statistical Papers Series J, No. 9, New York, 1966.

[b]EEC countries listed individually (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, West Germany). No data available for the USSR and The People's Republic of China.

[c]Includes exports of the Neutral Zone.

TABLE 19

EEC: Sources of Crude Petroleum[a]

(Including tonnage treated for the account of foreign operators)

Source of crude petroleum	1964			1965[b]			1966[c]		
	Millions of tons	Percent of total imports	Percent of total supply	Millions of tons	Percent of total imports	Percent of total supply	Millions of tons	Percent of total imports	Percent of total supply
Domestic production	15.5	—	7.3	15.5	—	6.4	15.2	—	5.6
Western Hemisphere	10.7	5.4	5.1	9.8	4.3	4.0	10.1	4.0	3.7
Africa	53.3	27.2	25.2	68.9	30.2	28.3	81.7	32.1	30.3
Middle East	122.0	62.3	57.7	139.1	61.1	57.2	150.8	59.2	55.9
Far East	—	—	—	0.0	0.0	0.0	—	—	—
Eastern Europe	9.9	5.1	4.7	10.0	4.4	4.1	12.0	4.7	4.5
Total imports	195.9	100.0	92.7	227.8	100.0	93.6	254.6	100.0	94.4
Total supply	211.4	—	100.0	243.3	—	100.0	269.3	—	100.0

[a]From Communauté Economique Européenne, Commission, Direction Général des Affaires Economiques et Financières, "Importations dans la Communauté de Pétrole Brut et de Produits Pétroliers en Provenance des Pays Tiers en 1964, 1965 et Estimations pour 1966–1967," Sep 66, p 4.

[b]Provisional figures.

[c]Estimates.

TABLE 20

Middle East Oil Production in 1966, by Country[a]

Company	Country's total oil production, thous of bbl/day	Company's percent of total oil production	Participants	Percent of ownership
		Abu Dhabi		
Abu Dhabi Petroleum Co. Ltd (onshore)	360	71.0	British Petroleum	23.75
			Shell	23.75
			Compagnie Française des Pétroles (CFP)	23.75
			Near East Development Corp. (Standard Oil, N.J., and Mobil)	23.75
			Participations & Explorations Co. (Partex-Gulbenkian estate)	5.0
Abu Dhabi Marine Areas Ltd (offshore)	—	29.0	British Petroleum	66.67
			CFP	33.33
		Bahrain		
Bahrain Petroleum Co. Ltd	60	100.0	Standard Oil, Calif.	50.0
			Texaco	50.0
		Egypt		
Compagnie Orientale des Pétroles (COPE)	119	75.0	ENI (Italian)	50.0
			Egyptian government	50.0
Egyptian government	—	25.0	Mobil (interest in three fields producing 4100 bbl/day)	50.0
			Egyptian government	50.0
Gulf of Suez Petroleum Co.	—	—[b]	Standard Oil, Ind.	50.0
			Egyptian government	50.0
		Iran		
Iranian Oil Participants Ltd	2110	95.5	British Petroleum	40.0
			Royal Dutch/Shell group	14.0
			CFP	6.0
			Standard Oil, Calif.	7.0
			Texaco	7.0
			Gulf	7.0
			Mobil	7.0
			Standard Oil, N.J.	7.0
			Iricon Agency[c]	5.0
Iran Pan American Oil Co.	—	3.0	Standard Oil, Ind.	50.0
			National Iranian Oil Co. of Iranian government (NIOC)	50.0
Société Irano-Italienne des Pétroles	—	1.0	AGIP S.p.A. (Italian)	50.0
			NIOC	50.0
Iranian government	—	0.5	—	—
		Iraq		
Iraq Petroleum Co. Ltd	1360	63.8	British Petroleum	23.75
			Shell	23.75
			CFP	23.75
Basrah Petroleum Co. Ltd		33.9	Near East Development Corp. (Standard Oil, N.J., and Mobil)	23.75
Mosul Petroleum Co. Ltd		1.8	Participations & Explorations Co. (Partex-Gulbenkian estate)	5.0
Iraq government	—	0.5	—	—

TABLE 20 (continued)

Company	Country's total oil production, thous of bbl/day	Company's percent of total oil production	Participants	Percent of ownership
		Kuwait		
Kuwait Oil Co. Ltd	2275	100.0	British Petroleum	50.0
			Gulf	50.0
		Neutral Zone: Saudi Arabia–Kuwait		
American Independent Oil Co. (Kuwait's undivided half interest onshore)	420	20.0	Phillips Petroleum	37.34
			Signel	33.58
			Ashland Oil & Refining	14.13
			J.S. Abercrombie Mineral	7.07
			Globe Oil & Refining	3.53
			Sunray DX Oil	2.94
			Pauley Petroleum	1.41
Getty Oil Co. (Saudi Arabia's undivided half interest onshore)	--	20.0	—	—
Arabian Oil Co. Ltd (offshore concession)	—	60.0	Saudi Arabian government	10.0
			Kuwaiti government	10.0
			Japanese interests	80.0
		Oman and Muscat		
Petroleum Development Ltd (Oman)	—	—[b]	Shell	85.0
			CFP	10.0
			Partex	5.0
		Qatar		
Qatar Petroleum Co. Ltd (onshore)	290	50.3	British Petroleum	23.75
			Shell	23.75
			CFP	23.75
			Near East Development Corp. (Standard Oil, N.J., and Mobil)	23.75
			Participations & Explorations Co. (Partex-Gulbenkian estate)	5.0
Royal Dutch/Shell group (offshore)	—	49.7	—	—
		Saudi Arabia		
Arabian American Oil Co.	2393	100.0	Standard Oil, Calif.	30.0
			Texaco	30.0
			Standard Oil, N.J.	30.0
			Mobil	10.0

[a]From "Tankers Move the Oil That Moves the World," Fortune, 1 Sep 67.

[b]Production starting in 1967.

[c]Equal shares held by American Independent Oil, Atlantic Richfield, Continental Oil, Getty Oil, Signal Oil & Gas, Standard, Ohio, and Tidewater Oil.

TABLE 21

Ownership of Refinery Capacity, 1965[a,b]

(In thousands of metric tons)

Location	Ownership			
	British and British-Dutch	US	Others	Total
Iran	—	—	25,355	25,355
Kuwait	5,950	11,175	--	17,125
Saudi Arabia	—	12,500	—	12,500
Bahrain	—	10,550	—	10,550
Aden	7,000	—	—	7,000
Egypt	—	63	6,837	6,900
Turkey	1,430	2,410	1,270	5,110
Israel	—	—	5,000	5,000
Iraq	219	109	3,472	3,800
Neutral Zone	—	2,700	--	2,700
Lebanon	835	1,215	500	2,550
Syria	—	—	1,000	1,000
Jordan	—	—	320	320
Qatar	15	7	8	30
Total	14,947	40,245	43,792	99,970

[a]From The Middle East and North Africa 1967–68, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1967, 14th ed, p 43.

[b]Latest available figures.

TABLE 22

Government Oil Revenues[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Year	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	Iran	Iraq	Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and Bahrain	Total Middle East
1956	310	300	153	193	47	1003
1957	338	323	213	137	57	1068
1958	425	310	247	224	72	1278
1959	405	315	263	243	69	1294
1960	465	355	285	266	70	1442
1961	464	396	301	266	70	1497
1962	526	446	334	267	75	1648
1963	555	489	398	308	83	1833
1964	624	552	474	353	95	2099
1965	636	639	532	368	120	2295

[a]From The Middle East and North Africa 1967–68, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1967, 14th ed, p 44.

TABLE 23

Major Crude-Oil Lines in the Middle East[a]

Route	In service	Company	Length, miles	Diameter, in.	Capacity, millions of tons per year
Established					
Kirkuk-Tripoli	1934	Iraq Petroleum	530	12	48
Kirkuk-Tripoli	1950	Iraq Petroleum	530	16	
Kirkuk-Tripoli	1961	Iraq Petroleum	530	30–32	
Kirkuk-Baniyas	1952	Iraq Petroleum	554	30–32	
Zubair-Rumailia-Fao	1954–1957	Iraq Petroleum	65	2 lines, 12–24	12
Dukhan-Umm Said	1949–1954	Qatar Petroleum	53	2 lines, 12–16	8
Agha Jari–Gach Saran–Bandar Mashur–Abadan	1940–1945	Iranian Oil Exploration & Production	100	12–24	51
Gach Saran–Kharg Island	1960	Iranian Oil Exploration & Production	100	26–28–30	22
Gach Saran–Bibi Hakimeh–Kharg Island	1965	Iranian Oil Exploration & Production	100	26–30	22
Central Area–Abadan	1911	Iranian Oil Exploration & Production	133	10–12	16
Agha Jari–Kharg Island	1965	Iranian Oil Exploration & Production	133	42	50
Abqaiq-Qaisumah-Saida	1950	Tapline	1068	30–31	25
Projected					
Karachok Homs-Tartus	1967–1968	National Oil Company of Syria	400	18	5
Natih/Fahud–Saih el Malih	1967	Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd	156	30–32–36	7
Zakum–Das Island	1967–1968	Abu Dhabi Marine Areas	56	30	10
Sassan–Lavan Island	Mid-1968	Lavan Petroleum	88	22	10
Batman-Dortyol	1967	Turkish Petroleum	310	18	3.5

[a]From The Middle East and North Africa 1967–68, Europa Publications Limited, London, 1967, 14th ed, p 49.

TABLE 24

Middle East Population, Area, and GNP[a]

Country	Population, 1966			Area			GNP,[b] 1965			Power per capita, kwh per year
	Total, millions of people	Rate of growth, %	Density, per sq mi	Total, thous of sq mi	Agricultural land		Total, millions of dollars	Per capita, dollars	Invest-ment, % of GNP	
					Percent of total area	Acres per capita				
Cyprus	0.6	1.5	169	4	57	2.1	417	702	20	556
Greece	8.6	0.5	168	51	68	2.6	5550	650	27	482
Iran	25.6	3.2	40	636	11	2.7	5947	240	18	88
Iraq	8.4	3.2	48	173	35	4.6	1909	233	15	138
Israel	2.7	2.6	332	8	53	1.0	3397	1325	28	1575
Jordan	2.0	3.0	52	38	12	1.4	462	244	18	80
Kuwait	0.5	12.0[c]	86	6	na[d]	na	1518	3196	na	1223
Lebanon	2.6	2.5	635	4	27	0.3	1120	450	na	290
Saudi Arabia	6.9	1.7	9	772	43[e]	3.1	1521	225	na	na
Syrian Arab Republic	5.9	3.0	82	71	69	5.6	1125	197	na	65
Turkey	31.9	2.5	106	301	70	4.2	8123	261	16	155
UAR	30.4	2.7	79	386	3	0.2	4700	160	na	174
Yemen	4.1	na	54	75	na	na	489	120	na	na

[a]From Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, "Selected Economic Data for the Less Developed Countries," Jun 67, p 5.

[b]GNP data unadjusted for inequalities in purchasing power among countries.

[c]Reflects substantial immigration.

[d]Not available.

[e]Mostly grazing land.

TABLE 25

Middle East Exports, Transport, Education, and Health[a]

Country	Export trade		Transport		Education				Health	
	Leading export		Miles of improved roads, per 1000 sq mi	Motor vehicles, thous	Literacy, %	Primary school pupils, thous	Secondary school pupils, thous	Primary school teachers, thous	Life expectancy, years	Number of people per physician
	Item	Percent of 1963–1965 exports								
Cyprus	Minerals	31	1409	42	76	70[b]	23[b]	2[b]	67	1,400
Greece	Tobacco	38	412	184	82	958	350	27	69	750
Iran	Oil	88	21	244	15–20	2057	426	57	na[c]	3,200
Iraq	Oil	93	40	78	20	958	223	36	na	4,800
Israel	Citrus	18	308	142	90	448	62	20	72	430
Jordan	Vegetables, fruits	30	51	17	35–40	382[d]		12[d]	na	4,700
Kuwait	Oil	97	83	52	47	44	24	2	na	800
Lebanon	Fruits	19	1083	114	86	334	78	14	na	1,400
Saudi Arabia	Oil	98	4	78	5–15	219[e]	18[e]	na	30–40	12,700
Syrian Arab Republic	Cotton	47	66	46	35	648	148	18	30–40	5,500
Turkey	Cotton	21	95	199	46	3736	479	79	48	3,200
UAR	Cotton	52	35	124	30	3335	668	86	na	2,500
Yemen	Coffee	30	5	na	10	58	1	1	30–40	54,000

[a]From Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Selected Economic Data for the Less Developed Countries," Jun 67, p 5.

[b]Greek schools only.

[c]Not available.

[d]Also includes preschool pupils and teachers.

[e]Public education only.

TABLE 26

Middle East Urban Population[a]

Country	Percent urban	Country	Percent urban
Egypt	37	Lebanon	56
Iraq	52	Saudi Arabia	28
Israel	82	Syria	45
Jordan	66	Yemen	10
Kuwait	93		

[a]From Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, A.I.D. Economic Data Book, Near East and South Asia, Dec 67.

TABLE 27

Minorities in the Middle East[a]

(Approximate percentages)

Country	Minority	Percent of population	Majority	Percent of population
Cyprus	Turkish	20	Greek	80
Egypt	Christian	7	Muslim	92
Iran	Turkish	15	Persian	67
	Kurdish	7		
	Arab	3		
	Sunni Muslim	8	Shii Muslim	90
Iraq	Kurdish	15	Arab	75
	Sunni Muslim	50	Shii Muslim	50
Israel[b]	Muslim	8	Jewish	89
Jordan[b]	Jordanian	33	Palestinian	65
Kuwait	Kuwaiti	47	Non-Kuwaiti	53
Lebanon	Christian	50	Muslim	50
Syria	Kurdish	7.5	Arab	81.5
	Alawite	11		
Turkey	Kurdish	6	Turkish	9[illegible]
Yemen	Zaidi	50	Shafii	50

[a]Exact and complete minority data are not available and thus numerous sources were used to compile this table.

[b]Before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war.

TABLE 28

Total Foreign Trade of the Middle East[a]

a. Balance of Trade, 1958–1965

(In millions of dollars)

Country	1958	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Iran							
Exports	741	845	849	983	933	1254	1301
Imports	572	625[b]	686	532	523	673	860
Balance	+169	+220	+163	+451	+410	+581	+441
Iraq							
Exports	567	654	662	692	781	840	876[b]
Imports	307	391	408	363	319	413	446
Balance	+260	+263	+254	+329	+462	+427	+430
Israel							
Exports	141	217	245	279	352	372	430
Imports	423	503	592	635	672	838	835
Balance	−282	−286	−347	−356	−320	−466	−405
Jordan							
Exports	10	11	15	17	18	24	28
Imports	95	120	117	128	152	141	157
Balance	− 85	−109	−102	−111	−134	−117	−129
Kuwait							
Exports	980	960	940	1050	1110	1218	1243
Imports[c]	260	242	249	285	324	322	377
Balance[c]	+720	+718	+691	+765	+786	+896	+856
Lebanon							
Exports	32	42	41	59	61	68	95[b]
Imports	213	311	332	358	386	431	485[b]
Balance	−181	−269	−291	−299	−325	−363	−390
Saudi Arabia							
Exports	780	820	880	940	1050	1180	1388
Imports	270	235	261	308	320	394	400[b]
Balance	+510	+585	+619	+632	+730	+786	+988
Syrian Arab Republic							
Exports	121	120	110	167	189	176	169
Imports	198	239	199	234	235	235	212
Balance	− 77	−119	− 89	− 67	− 46	− 59	− 43
Turkey							
Exports	247	321	347	381	368	411	459
Imports	315	468	509	622	691	542	577
Balance	− 68	−147	−162	−241	−323	−131	−118
UAR							
Exports	479	568	485	414	522	539	605
Imports	669	668	700	754	916	953	875
Balance	−190	−100	−215	−340	−394	−414	−270
Yemen Arab Republic	na[d]	na	na	na	na	na	na

TABLE 28 (continued)

b. Major Exports

Country	Item	Percent of 1962–1964 exports
Iran	Petroleum	88
Iraq	Petroleum	93
Israel	Polished diamonds	34
	Citrus fruits	19
Jordan	Fruits and vegetables	34
	Phosphates	25
Kuwait	Petroleum	98
Lebanon	Fruit	20
Saudi Arabia	Petroleum	99
Syrian Arab Republic	Cotton	47
Turkey	Tobacco	22
UAR	Cotton	52
Yemen Arab Republic	Coffee	60–70

[a]Data derived from publications of the UN and the International Monetary Fund, and country publications.
[b]Estimated.
[c]Exclusive of oil company imports.
[d]Not available.

TABLE 29

Defense Expenditure and National Economies in the Middle East, 1966[a]

Country	Defense expenditure, millions of dollars		Defense expenditure per capita per year, dollars	GNP[c] per capita, dollars	Defense expenditure, percent of GNP
	1965	1967–1968[b]			
Iran	255	480	10	275	3.6
Iraq	167	226	22	210	10.5
Israel	447	463	169	1390	12.2
Jordan	60	64	30	245	12.2
Saudi Arabia	138	286	28	230	12.1
Syria	110	125	20	168	11.9
Turkey	377	439	12	280	4.3
UAR	494	655	16	144	11.1

[a]From the Institute for Strategic Studies, "The Military Balance 1967–68," London, 1967, p47.
[b]The latest planned defense expenditure, i.e., for 1967 or 1967–1968 if known.
[c]GNP has been calculated in terms of market prices throughout.

TABLE 30

Major Weapons Sources for the Middle East[a]

Recipient	Supplier			
	Jet aircraft	Missiles	Warships	Tanks
Egypt	USSR	USSR	USSR, UK	USSR, UK, France
Iran	US	US	UK	US
Iraq	USSR, UK	USSR	—	USSR, UK, US
Israel	France	France, US	UK	UK, France, US
Jordan	UK	—	—	UK, US
Kuwait	UK	UK	—	UK
Lebanon	UK	—	—	UK, France, US
Saudi Arabia	US, UK	UK	—	US
Syria	USSR	USSR	—	USSR
Yemen	—	—	—	USSR

[a]From John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries 1945–1965," Adelphi Paper No. 28, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Oct 66, p 45.

TABLE 31

Tanks in the Middle East and North Africa[a]

Recipient	Supplier				
	USSR	UK	France	US	Principal armored units
Cyprus	30 T-34's	—	—	—	—
Egypt	60 JS-3's 750 T-34's, T-54's	30 Centurions	20 AMX-13's	—	3 armored brigades
Iran	—	—	—	M4, M47, M24	1 armored division 1 armored brigade
Iraq	375 T-34's, T-54's	120 Centurions	—	40 M24's	1 armored division
Israel[b]	—	Centurion[c]	AMX-13[c]	M4, M48	—
Jordan	—	Centurion[c]	—	100 M48's	2 armored brigades
Kuwait	—	25 Centurions	—	—	—
Lebanon[d]	—	—	42 AMX-13's	M41	2 armored battalions
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—	M41, M24	1 armored brigade
Syria[e]	350 T-34's, T-54's	—	—	—	3 armored brigades
Yemen	30 T-34's	—	—	—	—

[a]From John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries 1945–1965," Adelphi Paper No. 28, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Oct 66, p 93.

[b]Israel has about 600 tanks in all.

[c]Unknown number.

[d]In addition Lebanon has a few WWII German Mk 2's.

[e]Syria also has some older German tanks.

TABLE 32

Warship Deliveries, 1945–1965[a]

(By type and country of origin)

Recipient	Supplier, 1945–1955									Supplier, 1955–1965														Total 1945–1965	Operational 1965					
	UK				US			Canada	Total	UK					US			USSR				Italy	Total								
	CV[b]	C[b]	DD[b]	DE[b]	C	DE	SS[b]	DE		CV	C	DD	DE	SS	DD	DE	SS	C	DD	DE	SS	DE			CV	C	DD	DE	SS	Total[c]
Egypt	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	9	—	17	24	—	—	6	3	9	18
Iran	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	1	—	1
Israel	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4	6	—	—	2	2[d]	4	7
Total	—	—	2	8	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	2	—	4	—	—	—	—	6	—	9	—	21	31	—	—	8	5	13	26

[a]From John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries 1945–1965," Adelphi Paper No. 28, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Oct 66, p 40–41.

[b]CV, aircraft carriers (all types), C, cruisers; DD, leaders, large destroyers, destroyers, guided-missile destroyers; DE, destroyer escorts, frigates (UK definition), escorts; SS, submarines.

[c]Includes warships built locally and serviceable warships delivered before 1945.

[d]Captured from Egypt 1956.

TABLE 33

Military Jet Aircraft Delivered to the Middle East, 1945–1965[a]

Recipient	Total aircraft acquired[b]				Country of origin											
	1945–1955	1955–1965	Total 1945–1965	On hand 1965	1945–1955				1945–1965				On hand 1965			
					USSR	UK	US	France	USSR	UK	US	France	USSR	UK	US	France
Egypt	100	450	550	370	—	100	—	—	450	—	—	—	370	—	—	—
Iran	—	170	170	110	—	—	—	—	—	—	170	—	—	—	110	—
Iraq	28	124	152	80	—	28	—	—	64	55	5	—	46	34	—	—
Israel	32	289	321	260	—	20	—	12	—	3	—	286	—	—	—	270
Jordan	20	21	41	30	—	20	—	—	—	21	—	—	—	30	—	—
Kuwait	—	10	10	10	—	—	—	—	—	10	—	—	—	10	—	—
Lebanon	6	10	16	14	—	6	—	—	—	10	—	—	—	14	—	—
Saudi Arabia	—	20	20	16	—	—	—	—	—	—	20	—	—	—	16	—
Syria	20	126	146	94	—	20	—	—	119	7	—	—	94	—	—	—
Total	206	1220	1289	984	0	194	0	12	633	106	195	286	510	88	126	270

[a]From John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries 1945–1965," Adelphi Paper No. 28, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Oct 66, p 36.

[b]Figures include jet fighters, jet trainers, and light jet bombers acquired by purchase, grant, or licensed production.

TABLE 34

Distribution of Guided Missiles in the Middle East[a]

Recipient	Missile	Donor country	Approximate delivery date	Approximate number	Service role
Egypt	Styx	USSR	1961	>30	Ship-to-shore; for use with missile patrol boats
	Atoll	USSR	1962	>100	Air-to-air; for use with MiG-21
	SA-2 and SA-3 Guideline	USSR	1963	10 batteries	Antiaircraft defense
Iran	Hawk	US	1964	>100	Antiaircraft defense
Iraq	Guideline	USSR	1962	Hardly any now serviceable	Antiaircraft defense
Israel	SS-10 and SS-11	France	1956	—	Antitank missiles
	Matra 530	France	1963?	>100	Air-to-air; for use with Mirage IIIC
	Hawk	US	1964	1 battalion, >100	Antiaircraft defense; operational April 1965
Kuwait	Vigilant	UK	1964	—	Antitank missile
Saudi Arabia	Vigilant	UK	1964	—	Antitank missile
Syria	Styx	USSR	1957?	>10	Ship-to-shore; for use with patrol boats

[a]From John L. Sutton and Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms to Developing Countries 1945–1965," Adelphi Paper No. 28, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Oct 66, p 38.

TABLE 35

Trade with the Middle East: UK[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	26.2	30.9	31.9	35.3	36.8	39.5	37.7	20.4	20.3	31.1	31.6	31.7	38.0	38.9
Bahrain	21.5	22.9	23.2	21.2	21.5	25.3	22.6	40.0	38.6	44.4	42.5	40.4	13.4	15.8
Cyprus	35.6	39.3	43.0	44.0	31.9	44.7	47.4	21.5	22.5	33.5	28.7	29.4	29.5	34.7
Iraq	81.6	80.2	56.7	49.6	57.0	60.8	73.7	151.5	126.1	148.7	173.0	224.9	196.5	185.0
Israel	46.1	58.2	64.2	66.5	150.8	151.6	148.9	41.7	38.6	43.0	49.4	61.6	68.0	74.6
Jordan	16.9	21.6	20.7	25.3	24.8	23.7	25.3	0.4	0.7	1.3	0.8	3.4	1.4	1.2
Kuwait	42.6	47.4	48.8	61.3	54.1	53.3	72.8	448.8	460.2	450.1	427.6	346.8	253.8	260.1
Lebanon	31.1	45.5	33.5	40.3	42.5	43.3	47.3	5.3	5.2	8.3	10.5	7.5	5.9	7.3
Muscat and Oman	2.0	3.1	3.2	3.5	4.5	6.3	8.9	0.1	—	0.2	—	0.1	—	0.1
Qatar	14.0	12.8	13.8	10.1	7.6	10.3	9.3	14.4	15.6	19.0	16.2	18.1	12.3	47.2
Saudi Arabia	17.6	19.1	24.8	27.2	38.8	35.8	58.7	27.4	36.1	57.4	37.2	34.1	78.7	111.1
Syria	20.2	17.0	23.9	24.1	18.2	17.3	19.6	4.7	3.2	5.1	4.3	2.9	6.0	2.9
Trucial Oman	6.6	10.2	12.7	18.7	16.0	11.9	17.8	—	—	0.1	23.2	49.1	62.0	40.1
UAR	54.7	62.6	68.8	93.7	72.1	55.7	52.6	18.9	13.7	29.9	24.3	24.1	20.0	24.6
Total	416.7	470.8	459.2	520.8	576.6	579.5	642.1	795.1	780.8	872.1	869.3	874.1	785.5	843.7

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 36

UK Economic Ties with the Middle East[a]

Country	Sterling balances held,[b] millions of £	Oil sold to Britain, millions of net tons	Share of Britain's oil imports, %	Imports from west,[c] millions of £	Imports from Britain, millions of £	Exports from east, millions of £
Egypt	60–70	Negligible	Negligible	185	17	76
Syria		0	0	41	6	13
Iraq		10.3	15.4	84	24	27
Saudi Arabia	na[d]	6.4	9.6	116	14	Negligible
Jordan	478	0	0	32	7	7
Kuwait		15.6	23.3	86	21	10
Libya		10.0	14.9	94	17	Negligible
Sheikhdoms[e]		4.6	6.4	26	10	Negligible
Algeria	Negligible	1.5	2.2	244	8	Negligible

[a]From The Economist, CCXXIV: 1105 (10 Jun 67).
[b]End March 1967.
[c]Western Europe and America.
[d]Not available.
[e]Including Qatar, Bahrain, excluding Abu Dhabi.

TABLE 37

Trade with the Middle East: France[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	—	—	1.7	1.9	2.6	2.6	3.2	—	—	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.6
Bahrain	0.7	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.0	1.4	2.5	—	—	—	0.8	1.3	—	—
Cyprus	6.5	7.0	6.5	8.7	4.6	9.1	6.9	2.6	2.3	2.1	2.1	1.8	1.9	2.9
Iraq	1.7	3.3	1.8	2.5	5.0	6.8	13.1	158.4	135.0	139.4	181.3	150.6	184.8	190.0
Israel	28.9	43.8	42.7	48.1	83.2	43.3	47.1	3.4	3.9	6.8	10.1	9.7	12.6	17.0
Jordan	2.5	2.4	2.8	3.5	2.9	8.6	7.8	—	—	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1
Kuwait	5.6	5.6	7.7	7.6	7.0	9.1	12.3	142.4	160.8	149.6	149.6	176.1	153.6	143.3
Lebanon	35.1	37.2	31.7	44.7	44.7	42.7	46.2	1.7	1.0	1.1	1.8	2.1	2.8	7.3
Muscat and Oman	—	—	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.6	5.1	—	—	—	—	—	33.4	53.2
Qatar	0.4	0.7	0.7	0.5	0.8	1.4	1.2	35.3	33.8	32.9	24.8	27.5	26.1	32.2
Saudi Arabia	4.3	4.8	5.4	5.7	6.4	10.7	22.4	64.8	47.0	41.3	36.9	41.8	49.4	54.9
Syria	18.2	10.1	14.1	13.3	13.2	18.1	22.1	15.6	8.9	19.3	16.2	9.5	11.7	9.0
Trucial Oman	—	—	0.2	0.4	0.6	—	—	—	—	3.1	8.4	26.9	—	—
UAR	29.3	16.0	13.5	18.0	17.0	54.0	38.6	12.2	13.5	13.6	13.7	16.0	17.8	15.0
Total	133.2	131.7	130.0	156.5	189.6	209.4	228.5	436.4	406.2	409.6	446.2	463.6	494.4	525.5

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 38

Trade with the Middle East: West Germany[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	5.3	5.5	5.6	7.0	7.1	8.0	8.6	0.6	0.8	3.0	4.5	5.6	2.3	3.2
Bahrain	4.8	5.9	2.4	2.7	2.2	2.5	3.2	24.6	37.3	5.8	3.5	0.4	0.4	1.5
Cyprus	8.3	9.0	9.0	9.7	5.9	10.8	10.8	19.4	13.6	9.7	11.5	8.9	19.0	23.3
Iraq	32.6	38.3	34.7	27.8	30.1	39.6	58.4	91.1	79.8	101.2	97.1	94.4	81.8	62.9
Israel	66.2	79.4	57.6	58.4	60.9	68.9	63.3	24.1	28.8	31.6	55.9	39.3	51.5	57.0
Jordan	13.0	11.2	10.4	10.6	9.5	12.8	15.6	0.1	—	—	—	0.1	0.2	0.2
Kuwait	18.6	21.3	21.6	25.9	25.5	30.1	31.6	26.5	35.5	39.7	42.1	40.9	36.3	28.3
Lebanon	37.1	35.0	30.4	38.7	41.8	48.7	51.4	1.1	1.6	3.6	4.9	5.3	6.0	8.1
Muscat and Oman	0.1	0.1	0.9	1.7	2.3	2.3	3.2	—	—	—	—	26.4	46.2	62.6
Qatar	—	—	1.5	1.7	1.7	2.2	2.1	—	—	26.5	25.3	18.4	0.3	1.6
Saudi Arabia	16.3	22.7	18.9	20.4	29.4	36.5	42.7	125.8	72.3	54.0	77.7	128.8	132.3	144.2
Syria	25.6	22.7	26.6	28.2	23.0	23.1	25.3	5.4	5.0	16.6	6.2	4.4	8.1	9.0
UAR	112.9	96.0	87.3	100.4	108.8	102.2	91.2	30.4	24.5	24.4	35.0	33.8	36.5	30.7
Yemen	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.5	1.1	0.7	0.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.2
Total	341.0	347.2	307.2	333.7	349.3	388.4	408.6	349.1	299.2	316.1	363.7	406.7	420.9	432.8

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 39

Trade with the Middle East: EEC[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	14.0	17.3	18.9	21.3	24.3	27.0	25.4	4.4	3.0	8.4	10.2	14.5	10.2	8.7
Bahrain	13.3	14.5	7.2	8.5	9.2	8.8	11.4	33.5	44.8	15.2	11.3	5.2	4.0	6.2
Cyprus	28.9	30.7	34.0	37.7	24.0	39.8	37.6	26.0	21.6	17.4	21.4	17.7	27.1	33.4
Iraq	68.3	75.0	70.3	56.7	69.4	80.9	119.8	437.1	421.5	428.6	471.3	398.8	414.0	411.7
Israel	147.4	173.3	143.3	157.6	233.7	189.9	190.4	58.5	65.5	71.5	109.7	95.6	110.2	128.4
Jordan	29.3	22.6	24.3	24.2	23.4	34.6	39.0	0.2	0.2	0.4	1.0	1.0	2.2	2.1
Kuwait	46.1	47.5	57.0	64.5	61.9	74.6	81.8	452.6	443.0	504.0	573.9	644.7	689.0	658.7
Lebanon	121.5	125.4	111.5	140.9	151.1	159.0	173.9	49.2	56.8	71.4	58.9	85.9	51.2	45.8
Muscat and Oman	0.6	0.8	4.0	5.3	7.2	11.9	21.7	0.1	—	—	1.0	33.6	93.9	128.3
Qatar	0.4	2.8	4.3	4.3	5.4	8.8	8.9	35.3	33.8	69.1	54.0	62.4	55.2	69.6
Saudi Arabia	45.5	50.4	53.3	58.2	82.4	104.6	125.3	342.1	264.9	230.7	282.9	365.6	423.5	554.0
Syria	75.5	55.7	69.7	69.0	59.0	63.6	80.4	97.6	127.4	146.5	144.9	118.1	117.5	93.2
Trucial Oman	—	—	0.2	0.4	0.6	—	—	—	—	3.1	8.4	26.9	—	—
UAR	199.2	159.6	157.4	200.2	181.8	236.8	194.2	87.5	83.3	92.5	110.8	116.6	105.3	91.8
Yemen	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.9	2.1	2.4	3.2	2.6	2.0	1.9	1.7	2.1	2.1	2.6
Total	790.5	776.0	755.8	849.7	935.5	1042.7	1113.0	1626.7	1567.8	1660.7	1861.4	1988.7	2105.4	2234.5

[a]Countries: Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Italy, Netherlands, and West Germany. From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 40

Trade with the Middle East: Netherlands[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	4.5	5.0	5.7	6.5	8.0	7.1	7.0	1.9	0.6	2.3	1.1	1.9	0.9	0.4
Bahrain	5.7	5.8	2.1	2.1	2.8	2.3	3.0	3.6	3.1	2.5	2.0	1.2	1.5	3.4
Cyprus	3.3	3.3	3.9	3.6	3.0	4.2	4.2	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.9	1.8	2.2	3.0
Iraq	10.0	9.1	10.5	7.3	8.2	7.0	9.1	0.2	3.0	1.7	5.9	5.5	6.1	11.2
Israel	22.4	21.5	15.4	17.1	25.7	21.8	21.5	6.2	5.5	8.7	13.8	12.9	13.3	13.4
Jordan	3.7	2.7	2.6	3.3	3.9	3.6	4.6	—	—	0.1	0.1	—	—	0.3
Kuwait	5.9	5.2	7.4	8.1	9.5	9.4	9.3	132.6	103.4	117.9	126.3	99.2	86.7	106.4
Lebanon	9 0	10.9	9.5	10.5	12.3	12.0	12.6	36.1	45.2	55.8	43.1	63.1	26.0	21.7
Muscat and Oman	0.3	0.3	2.0	2.1	3.1	3.5	5.4	—	—	—	—	6.6	5.1	0.8
Qatar	—	—	1.2	1.5	1.5	2.9	2.0	—	—	4.7	3.2	14.4	20.4	19.4
Saudi Arabia	9.9	8.5	11.5	10.4	13.7	17.6	19.6	28.6	32.1	25.2	33.3	26.7	41.1	91.2
Syria	9.3	8.7	7.3	7.1	5.9	5.0	5.4	68.6	101.2	84.2	94.8	93.6	81.9	62.3
UAR	17.2	15.1	17.1	13.5	12.0	15.2	16.5	9.9	5.9	7.3	5.1	14.0	7.9	4.6
Total	101.2	96.1	96.2	93.1	109.6	111.6	120.2	288.5	301.0	311.3	330.6	340.9	293.7	338.1

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 41

Trade with the Middle East: Italy[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	2.9	5.6	4.6	4.8	5.5	7.6	5.6	1.8	1.3	1.4	3.8	6.7	6.5	3.4
Bahrain	—	—	1.3	1.7	2.3	1.8	2.1	—	—	0.9	1.1	0.2	—	0.1
Cyprus	8.3	8.3	10.6	12.1	8.4	12.4	12.0	2.4	4.3	4.0	4.8	4.5	3.5	3.6
Iraq	7.4	8.7	9.5	8.2	12.4	12.4	23.8	139.9	155.8	134.2	156.2	112.3	123.1	123.9
Israel	19.7	18.1	14.1	17.3	30.3	29.9	30.1	11.6	12.1	10.1	9.1	7.8	8.3	9.7
Jordan	7.1	3.2	5.2	4.1	4.7	6.6	7.9	0.1	—	0.1	0.6	0.8	1.9	1.5
Kuwait	8.3	9.1	11.6	13.6	14.7	19.4	21.8	135.0	139.5	176.0	195.1	295.1	361.1	328.0
Lebanon	26.2	28.2	26.8	31.8	37.4	41.4	49.6	3.8	3.0	3.7	5.9	5.1	7.6	5.9
Muscat and Oman	—	—	—	0.1	0.4	3.7	7.0	—	—	—	1.0	—	1.9	4.3
Qatar	—	2.1	0.2	0.2	0.7	1.3	2.8	—	—	5.0	0.7	0.8	8.4	16.4
Saudi Arabia	7.7	8.3	11.7	12.1	17.9	27.1	25.9	98.6	102.3	109.2	133.1	161.3	186.5	243.0
Syria	14.4	9.8	13.0	11.9	11.2	11.9	22.3	5.4	5.2	21.8	24.1	8.2	12.6	8.4
UAR	30.8	26.7	34.3	62.4	39.5	60.8	39.3	29.8	33.6	42.3	49.7	43.0	37.4	34.7
Yemen	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2	0.5	1.0	1.1	2.0	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.1	1.2	1.6
Total	133.0	128.3	143.0	180.5	185.9	237.3	251.3	430.4	458.4	509.8	586.2	646.9	760.0	784.5

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 42

Trade with the Middle East: Belgium-Luxembourg[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	1.7	1.0	0.1	0.3	1.5	0.6	0.1	0.3	1.1
Bahrain	2.1	2.0	0.7	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.6	5.3	4.4	6.0	3.9	2.1	2.1	1.2
Cyprus	2.5	3.1	4.0	3.6	2.1	3.3	3.7	0.8	0.4	0.7	1.1	0.7	0.5	0.6
Iraq	16.6	15.6	13.8	10.9	13.7	15.1	15.4	47.5	47.9	52.1	30.8	36.0	18.2	23.7
Israel	10.2	10.5	13.5	16.7	33.6	26.0	27.9	13.2	15.2	14.3	20.8	25.9	24.5	31.3
Jordan	3.0	3.1	3.3	2.7	2.4	3.0	3.1	—	0.2	—	—	—	—	—
Kuwait	7.7	6.3	8.7	9.3	5.2	6.6	6.8	16.1	3.8	20.8	60.8	33.4	51.3	52.7
Lebanon	14.1	14.1	13.1	15.2	14.9	14.2	14.1	6.5	6.0	7.2	3.2	10.3	8.2	2.8
Muscat and Oman	—	0.4	0.6	0.9	0.8	0.8	1.0	—	—	—	—	0.6	7.3	7.4
Qatar	—	—	0.7	0.4	0.7	1.0	0.8	—	—	—	—	1.3	—	—
Saudi Arabia	7.3	6.1	5.8	9.6	15.0	12.7	14.7	24.3	11.2	1.0	1.9	7.0	14.2	20.7
Syria	8.0	4.4	8.7	8.5	5.7	5.5	5.3	2.6	7.1	4.6	3.6	2.4	3.2	4.5
UAR	9.0	5.8	5.2	5.9	4.5	4.6	8.6	5.2	5.8	4.9	7.3	9.8	5.7	6.8
Total	81.8	72.6	79.3	85.7	100.6	95.3	103.0	121.6	102.3	113.1	134.0	129.6	135.5	152.8

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 43

Trade with the Middle East: Japan[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	15.6	17.6	18.3	26.0	29.0	30.4	30.5	1.4	4.6	1.9	7.1	11.5	9.1	6.4
Bahrain	4.5	5.3	5.6	5.5	6.7	5.6	7.4	8.2	16.2	13.6	13.7	14.0	17.8	9.9
Cyprus	0.4	0.5	1.2	2.9	2.3	3.7	4.3	2.6	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.6	—	2.0
Iraq	18.8	18.1	14.5	7.5	17.4	24.3	28.2	66.1	52.5	33.8	41.0	48.6	72.3	67.4
Israel	2.5	2.1	6.1	9.4	13.9	21.0	20.6	1.7	4.0	5.2	6.1	15.0	25.1	12.1
Jordan	3.9	4.5	6.2	5.6	5.9	6.5	7.4	—	0.3	0.2	—	0.6	0.7	0.2
Kuwait	22.4	26.1	27.0	25.6	34.3	40.6	48.1	205.3	239.1	262.5	252.2	282.0	305.6	290.4
Lebanon	5.9	6.8	9.9	14.7	16.3	16.7	19.5	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.6	2.1
Saudi Arabia	15.6	19.4	22.5	28.6	38.2	52.6	74.1	105.5	129.0	165.2	279.5	329.7	376.4	432.5
Syria	6.9	4.4	8.6	10.0	8.8	10.1	10.5	2.7	1.4	0.8	1.0	1.6	1.1	7.8
Trucial Oman	4.7	4.2	4.0	4.8	7.5	7.9	11.8	1.2	3.7	7.0	14.6	8.8	14.7	20.6
UAR	20.4	22.1	16.4	24.4	17.[illegible]	17.3	25.7	18.6	17.5	10.6	16.8	21.8	27.9	17.7
Yemen	—	—	—	—	0.1	—	0.1	0.9	1.7	1.9	1.3	0.9	0.5	1.2
Total	121.6	131.1	140.3	165.0	198.2	236.7	288.2	414.8	470.7	503.3	643.9	735.3	851.8	870.3

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 44

Diplomatic Relations of the Middle East with the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China[a]

With the Republic of China	With the People's Republic of China			With neither
	Country	Date of recognition	Date diplomatic relations established	
Cyprus	Iraq	July 1958	August 1958	Israel[b]
Iran	Syria	August 1956	August 1956	
Jordan	UAR	May 1956	May 1956	
Kuwait	Yemen	August 1956	September 1956	
Lebanon				
Saudi Arabia				
Turkey				

[a]From Dept of State, RFE-18, 27 Apr 66.

[b]Recognized Peking in 1950; no diplomatic relations.

TABLE 45

Trade with the Middle East: People's Republic of China[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Iraq	6.4	5.7	8.3	11.4	13.2	—	19.8	—	1.5	4.4	5.0	5.3	—	7.2
Jordan	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.8	2.1	3.3	5.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4
Kuwait	1 0	1.5	2.0	2.7	5.4	—	3.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lebanon	—	—	1.9	2.5	3.4	—	—	—	—	0.2	0.1	—	—	—
Syria	1.2	1.1	3.3	2.7	4.9	5.2	14.4	—	13.3	4.7	21.8	31.2	18.4	21.3
UAR	17.7	17.1	17.4	18.0	16.2	24.1	36.3	48.9	16.0	21.2	18.0	18.4	49.6	35.7
Total	27.3	26.3	34.1	39.1	45.2	32.6	89.2	48.9	30.8	30.5	44.9	54.9	68.0	65.6

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966. Data derived from reports of trading partners.

TABLE 46

Communist Economic Credits and Grants Extended to Middle Eastern Countries, 1954–1966[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	1954–1966				1966			
	Total	USSR	East Europe	Communist China	Total	USSR	East Europe	Communist China
Greece	84	84	—	—	—	—	—	—
Iran	376	330	46	—	—	—	—	—
Iraq	190	190	—	—	6	6	—	—
Syria	363	233	114	16	162	133	29	—
Turkey	218	210	8	—	—	—	—	—
UAR	1636	1011	540	85	—	—	—	—
Yemen	149	92	17	40	1	—	1	—
Total	3016	2150	725	141	169	139	30	0
World total	8729	5939	1945	845	1164	974	158	32

[a]From Dept of State, Director of Intelligence and Research, "Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Economic Aid and Trade," RSB-80, 21 Jul 67.

TABLE 47

Trade with the Middle East: Sino-Soviet Area[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	—	—	0.3	—	—	—	0.1	—	2.8	3.9	6.9	7.6	—	7.1
Cyprus	0.5	2.3	3.1	3.5	2.7	7.0	9.0	0.3	3.2	6.1	5.2	5.6	9.7	9.4
Iraq	34.0	4.7	9.5	12.4	8.4	—	11.3	5.3	52.4	60.5	63.9	74.3	—	91.4
Israel	2.5	6.7	8.7	9.6	15.0	17.3	22.4	2.8	6.4	8.5	13.4	18.0	16.7	18.0
Jordan	2.4	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.1	0.8	1.0	0.6	6.3	8.6	14.1	14.4	18.4	20.2
Kuwait	1.3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.8	2.2	2.9	9.6	—	37.2
Lebanon	16.2	3.3	5.0	5.6	5.1	—	—	6.6	16.4	22.1	32.2	39.4	—	—
Syria	16.7	27.0	39.3	61.4	70.9	56.9	60.8	13.5	25.7	33.9	25.6	37.6	35.6	85.9
UAR	181.0	218.8	171.5	233.8	247.0	319.6	321.9	290.9	176.4	173.5	164.3	174.5	213.3	287.0
Yemen	3.7	2.1	2.3	3.3	—	—	—	1.6	1.5	1.8	1.9	—	—	—
Total	258.3	265.8	240.8	330.8	350.2	401.6	426.5	321.6	301.9	321.1	330.4	381.0	293.7	556.2

[a]Countries included: USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, China Mainland, and Cuba. From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

TABLE 48

Trade with the Middle East: USSR[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	—	—	—	0.6	—	2.1	2.1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Cyprus	—	1.6	1.6	1.8	1.4	4.0	3.9	—	1.5	1.9	1.4	0.5	3.3	5.1
Iraq	20.2	19.1	21.9	23.5	19.1	—	23.1	3.4	2.2	3.5	6.3	2.3	—	2.5
Israel	—	—	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.4	0.9	—	—	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	2.0
Jordan	—	—	0.4	1.5	1.6	3.0	3.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kuwait	—	—	—	—	—	5.3	7.7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Lebanon	4.3	3.3	4.2	3.9	5.2	—	—	3.9	1.8	2.2	0.9	4.1	—	—
Syria	11.0	7.4	3.4	2.2	3.9	5.6	19.7	7.8	3.5	5.6	14.9	18.0	18.5	20.2
UAR	69.6	71.5	52.4	44.2	66.5	75.6	84.4	121.3	80.3	70.4	111.8	106.0	143.4	156.8
Yemen	3.6	2.1	2.3	3.3	—	—	—	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.7	—	—	—
Total	108.7	105.0	86.4	81.3	97.8	96.0	144.7	137.7	90.7	85.5	137.6	131.4	165.8	186.6

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966. Data derived from reports of trading partners.

TABLE 49

US Military Assistance Grant-Aid Program—Chargeable to Appropriation Deliveries by Fiscal Year[a]

(In millions of dollars)

Country	FY50–FY60	FY61	FY62	FY63	FY64	FY65	FY66	FY50–FY65[b]
Iran	403.5	49.2	33.3	66.0	27.3	49.9	41.1	670.3
Iraq	46.1	—[c]	—[c]	—[c]	0.1	0.2	0.2	46.6
Jordan	13.6	1.9	2.6	2.5	8.1	4.6	2.8	36.1
Lebanon	7.2	0.9	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	8.7
Saudi Arabia	14.2	4.1	5.6	4.7	1.1	0.8	1.5	32.3
Syria	—	—	—	—	—[c]	—[c]	—[c]	—[c]
Turkey	1579.7	85.9	156.4	160.8	101.6	118.4	100.4	2303.1
Yemen	—	—	—	—	—	—[c]	—[c]	—[c]
Near East–South Asia area	11.7	2.9	2.2	2.7	0.2	<0.3	—	19.1

[a]From Dept of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, "Military Assistance and Foreign Military Sales Facts," May 67, p 10.

[b]Totals are sums of unrounded figures, hence may vary from totals of rounded amounts.

[c]Less than $50,000.

TABLE 50

US Economic Assistance: AID and Predecessor Agencies Cumulative, 3 Apr 48 to 30 Jun 66[a]

(In millions of dollars)

Country	Net obligations and loan authorizations			Total expenditures
	Total	Loans	Grants	
Iraq	19.0	—	19.0	18.8
Israel	513.4	235.4	278.0	478.6
Jordan	436.2	12.0	424.2	421.7
Lebanon	57.5	4.9	52.6	57.3
Saudi Arabia	27.4	—	27.4	27.4
Syrian Arab Republic	19.8	18.2	1.6	4.6
Turkey	1741.0	799.3	941.7	1476.3
UAR	172.2	103.1	69.2	149.5
Yemen	31.7	—	31.7	29.3

[a]From Agency for International Development, Office of Program Coordination, Statistics and Reports Division, "U.S. Economic Assistance Programs Administered by the Agency for International Development and Predecessor Agencies April 3, 1948–June 30, 1966," 30 Mar 67, p 10.

TABLE 51

Investments of the US: Value of Direct Investments by Selected Industries[a]

(In millions of dollars)

Industry	1965[b]		1966[c]	
	Total	Middle East	Total	Middle East
Mining and smelting	3,785	2	4,135	3
Petroleum	15,298	1436	16,264	1560
Manufacturing	19,339	44	22,050	51
Public utilities	2,136	4	2,286	4
Trade	4,219	13	4,706	16
Other	4,550	36	5,121	38
Total	49,328	1536	54,562	1671

[a]From Walther Lederer and Frederick Cutler, "International Investments of the United States in 1966," Survey of Current Business, 47: 39–51 (Sep 67), p 42.
[b]Revised.
[c]Preliminary.

TABLE 52

Investments of the US: Direct-Investment Capital Outflows and US Share in Reinvested Earnings of Foreign Corporations[a,b]

(Major industries for 1966, in millions of dollars)

Industry	Net capital outflows				Reinvested earnings of foreign corporations			
	1965[c]		1966[d]		1965[c]		1966[d]	
	Total	Middle East	Total	Middle East	Total	Middle East	Total	Middle East
Mining and smelting	—	—	220	—	—	—	130	—
Petroleum	—	—	876	112	—	—	100	12
Manufacturing	—	—	1730	4	—	—	975	2
Other	—	—	716	5	—	—	511	—[e]
Total	3418	245	3543	121	1542	3	1716	13

[a]From Walther Lederer and Frederick Cutler, "International Investments of the United States in 1966," Survey of Current Business, 47: 39–51 (Sep 67), p 42.
[b]Income is the sum of dividends and interest, net after foreign withholding taxes, received by, or credited to, the account of the US owner, and branch profit after foreign taxes but before US taxes; earnings is the sum of the US share in the net earnings (or losses) of foreign corporations and branch profits after foreign taxes but before US taxes; reinvested earnings is computed as the difference between the US share of net earnings (or losses) of foreign corporations and the US share of gross dividends (dividends before deduction of withholding taxes).
[c]Revised.
[d]Preliminary.
[e]Less than $500,000.

TABLE 53

Investments of the US: Direct-Investment Earnings and Income[a,b]

(Major industries for 1966, in millions of dollars)

Industry	Earnings				Income			
	1965[c]		1966[d]		1965[c]		1966[d]	
	Total	Middle East	Total	Middle East	Total	Middle East	Total	Middle East
Mining and smelting	—	—	660	—	—	—	524	—
Petroleum	—	—	1859	863	—	—	1778	852
Manufacturing	—	—	2098	6	—	—	1118	4
Other	—	—	1063	7	—	—	625	7
Total	5460	840	5680	876	3963	836	4045	863

[a]From Walther Lederer and Frederick Cutler, "International Investments of the United States in 1966," Survey of Current Business, 47: 39–51 (Sep 67), p 43.

[b]Income is the sum of dividends and interest, net after foreign withholding taxes, received by, or credited to, the account of the US owner, and branch profit after foreign taxes but before US taxes; earnings is the sum of the US share in the net earnings (or losses) of foreign corporations and branch profits after foreign taxes but before US taxes; reinvested earnings is computed as the difference between the US share of net earnings (or losses) of foreign corporations and the US share of gross dividends (dividends before deduction of withholding taxes).

[c]Revised.

[d]Preliminary.

TABLE 54

Trade with the Middle East: US[a]

(In millions of US dollars)

Country	Exports							Imports						
	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966
Aden	2.4	3.6	3.3	5.8	5.2	5.6	4.8	0.2	—	—	0.1	0.4	0.2	1.0
Bahrain	8.4	9.6	8.8	9.0	8.8	9.8	12.1	2.8	1.2	0.5	3.1	2.7	2.4	2.4
Cyprus	2.4	—	5.6	3.5	4.6	2.9	4.3	0.3	—	0.8	0.9	1.3	1.3	0.9
Iraq	37.2	37.2	34.4	32.8	56.4	40.1	46.2	27.0	30.0	9.8	9.2	8.4	18.9	21.3
Israel	126.2	147.6	174.7	166.9	181.4	200.8	209.7	27.3	32.4	41.3	47.2	56.1	62.1	77.1
Jordan	16.8	24.0	20.2	37.2	20.3	19.5	48.2	0.1	—	—	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2
Kuwait	40.8	56.4	64.1	60.0	55.3	65.9	89.0	123.3	109.2	87.9	67.7	52.0	47.2	28.9
Lebanon	44.4	45.6	43.5	51.2	57.2	74.5	83.6	3.6	4.8	5.1	6.9	8.0	5.5	8.6
Saudi Arabia	43.2	55.2	77.6	69.3	89.2	128.7	152.0	48.9	56.2	67.1	78.2	86.0	105.8	95.6
Syria	37.2	26.4	29.5	15.2	11.0	13.3	19.8	6.6	4.8	4.4	4.0	5.4	3.7	4.7
UAR	151.2	163.2	235.2	209.8	268.2	158.0	189.3	31.6	34.8	25.5	19.9	16.2	16.1	17.8
Total	520.2	568.8	696.9	660.7	757.6	719.1	859.0	271.7	273.4	242.4	237.3	236.7	263.5	258.5

[a]From International Monetary Fund, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Direction of Trade, 1960–1964, 1961–1965, 1962–1966.

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. Discussion of the definition of the Middle East and the historical development of the term may be found in Roderic H. Davison, "Where is the Middle East?" Foreign Affairs, 38:665–75 (Jul 60), reprinted in Richard H. Nolte (ed), The Modern Middle East, Atherton Press, New York, 1963, pp 13–29. Additional discussion may be found in G. Etzel Pearcy, "The Middle East—An Indefinable Region," Dept of State Publication7684, Near and Middle Eastern Series 72, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D.C., Jun 64. Pages 2 and 3 of the Pearcy publication contain a map illustrating the flexibility of delineation employed in discussing the Middle East.
2. The development of a fleet of supertankers has reduced the value of the Canal and the trend toward huge tankers able to ply alternative routes economically continues at a steady pace. Whereas the average tanker in 1966 was about 30,000 tons, tankers of 100,000 and 200,000 tons now exist and plans for 500,000-ton tankers are under negotiation. These ships pose a double threat to the Canal because they cannot traverse it and they make alternative routes economically attractive. The tankers themselves are economical both in terms of production (by applying economies of scale) and in terms of utilization. See "Race Toward Bigger Tankers Unabated," US Transport 2:1,20 (Nov 67) and The Wall Street Journal, 14 Aug 67. Plans for widening and deepening the Canal have been prepared by the Suez Canal Authority under the heading "The Nasser Project for Widening and Deepening the Suez Canal." For details, see the annual Suez Canal Reports prepared by the Suez Canal Authority, UAR.
3. See Admiral Sir John Hamilton, "The Military Importance of the Mediterranean," NATO Letter, 15:22–25 (Jul-Aug 67).
4. Indeed, Napoleon argued that Egypt is "the most important country" because of its strategic location, particularly vis-à-vis Europe. For an elaboration of this view see the address by LTG Sir John Bagot Glubb to the Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 26 Oct 67, the full text of which is reprinted in Congressional Record, 15 Dec 67, pp H17250–53. See also LTG Sir John Bagot Glubb, "Power Grab in Mideast?" Christian Science Monitor, 11 Nov 67, and Glubb Pasha (sic), The Middle East Crisis: A Personal Interpretation, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 67.
5. See Harold Lubell, Middle East Oil Crises and Western Europe's Energy Supplies, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, Md., 1963.
6. See Communaute Economique Europeenne, Commission, Direction Generale des Affaires Economiques et Financieres, Importations dans la Communaute de Petrole Brut et de Produits Pétroliers en Provenance des Pays Tiers en 1964, 1965 et Estimations pour 1966-1967, Sep 66; Marwan Iskander, "The European Common Market and Middle East Oil," a paper presented at the Fourth Arab Petroleum Congress, Beirut, 5–12 Nov 63, and published in Fourth Arab Petroleum Congress, "Papers and Discussions," Vol I: Economics, Paper 45 A-1. The Economist, CCXXIV:1133 (10 Jun 67) has estimated that in 1975 Western Europe would consume 720 million tons of oil of which 76 percent would be Arab oil.
7. See Zuhayr Mikdashi, A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil Concessions, 1901-1965, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1966.
8. See Nicolas Sarkis, Le Pétrole et les Economies Arabes, R. Pichon et R. Durand-Auzias, Paris, Part 1, 1963. Income from oil transit pipelines is an important source of revenue for states with little or no oil production capability. On oil pipelines in the region, see Table 23.

9. For an examination of the population growth problem see J. C. Hurewitz, "The Politics of Rapid Population Growth in the Middle East," J. Internat. Affairs, 19:26–38 (1965). For an earlier treatment of this subject see W.B. Fisher, "Population Problems of the Middle East," Roy. Central Asian J., 36:208–20 (Jul-Oct 49).
10. For an elaboration of this concept see William R. Polk, "Social Modernization: The New Men," in Georgiana G. Stevens (ed), The United States and the Middle East, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964, pp 30–52.
11. Population figures for Yemen are, at best, little more than reasonable approximations but most recent estimates indicate that about 55 percent of the Yemeni population belongs to the Shafi'i sect.
12. For a general discussion of the problems of population growth and food supply see Jean Bourgeois-Pichat, "Population Growth and Development," Internat. Conciliation, No. 556 (Jan 66). See also W. Hardy Wickwar, "Food and Social Development in the Middle East," Middle East J., 20:279–95 (Summer 66).
13. See Kurt Grunwald and Joachim O. Ronall, Industrialization in the Middle East, Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press, New York, 1960, and Studies on Selected Development Problems in Various Countries in the Middle East, UN Economic and Social Office, Beirut, 1967.
14. On the effects of change and development in the Middle East, see John Gulick (ed), "Dimensions of Cultural Change in the Middle East," Human Organization, Vol 24, Spring 65.
15. For an examination of the monarchy, see K.J. Newman, "The New Monarchies of the Middle East," J. Internat. Affairs, 13:157–68 (1959).
16. See David Wood, "The Middle East and the Arab World: The Military Context," Adelphi Paper No.20, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Jul 65.
17. On these early beginnings, see Jamal Mohammed Ahmed, The Intellectual Origins of Egyptian Nationalism, Oxford University Press, London, 1960.
18. In a speech at Mansion House on 29 May 41, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden declared:
> "The Arab World has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out toward this unity, they hope for support. No such appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties, too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval."

Times (London), 30 May 41, as cited in George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1956, 2nd ed, p 503.
19. See Andrea Arntsen, "Yemen and South Arabia: External Involvement and Internal Conflict," RAC-TP-325, Research Analysis Corporation, in preparation.
20. This section is based on Bernard Reich, "Crisis in the Middle East, 1967: Implications for US Policy," RAC-R-39, Research Analysis Corporation, Mar 68.
21. For an examination of the ideological facet of the encounter between Zionism and Arab nationalism by an Arab nationalist, see Fayez A. Sayegh, "The Encounter of Two Ideologies—Zionism and Arabism," in William Sands (ed), The Arab Nation: Paths and Obstacles to Fulfillment, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1961, pp 73–91 (a series of addresses presented at the Fourteenth Annual Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs, sponsored by The Middle East Institute, May 5-7, 1960).
22. "Palestine occupies a vital position—spiritual, geographic and strategic—in the Arab world. It stands in the heart of the Arab world at the junction of communications between Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Without Palestine the Arab League would remain incomplete and unreal, crippled at a very sensitive point." E. Atiyah, "The Arab League," World Affairs, (New Series) 1: 34–47 (Jan 47), p 43.
23. George Antonius describes the correspondence in this manner:
> "The obligations incurred by each side with regard to military performance were not explicitly stated, for they had been debated orally with the Sharif's messenger. But it was understood all along (and the Sharif never questioned) that he would bring all his power and influence, with all the material resources he could muster, to bear on the task of

defeating Turkey, and similarly understood that Great Britain would help him by supplementing his deficient material resources, in arms, equipment, and money. On the political side, the Sharif had committed himself to the proclamation of an Arab Revolt and to an open denunciation of the Turks as enemies of Islam, while Great Britain had explicity incurred two distinct obligations: to recognise the Arab caliphate if one were proclaimed; to recognise and uphold Arab independence in a certain area."

George Antonius, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1938, p 176. For the text of the correspondence, see pp 413–27; for a discussion of it, see pp 164–83.

24. A portion of the correspondence is available in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, N.J., 1956, Vol 2, pp 13–17. Arab hopes were further encouraged, in their view, by other statements, including Wilson's Fourteen Points and a series of British and Joint British-French statements issued during and immediately following WWI. See, for example, "British and Anglo-French Statements to the Arabs January-November 1918," in Hurewitz, Vol 2, pp 28-30.
25. See Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 18-22.
26. See Ref 24, pp 25-27. A useful study of this aspect of the problem is Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration, Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1961.
27. For a full discussion of the Arab-Jewish conflict during the Mandatory period, see J. C. Hurewitz, The Struggle for Palestine, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1950 and William R. Polk, David M. Stamler, and Edmund Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy: The Struggle for Palestine, The Beacon Press, Boston, Mass., 1957.
28. At the Preparatory Committee meeting in Alexandria in September 1944 Musa al-Alami represented the Arabs of Palestine and took part in the deliberations with standing equal to that of the other delegations. At the close of those meetings a Protocol was issued 7 Oct 44 with a "Special Resolution Concerning Palestine": "The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability in the Arab World." For the full text of the Alexandria Protocol, see Muhamman Khalil, The Arab States and the Arab League: A Documentary Record, Khayats, Beirut, 1962, Vol 2, pp 53-56.
29. A useful compilation of the basic views of the parties may be found in Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies, 2 vols, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1947. The position of the Zionist movement as presented to the UN by the Jewish Agency is available as Book of Documents Submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations Relating to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish People, the Jewish Agency for Palestine, New York, May 47.
30. For the text of the General Assembly resolution and the "Plan of Partition with Economic Union" see Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 281–95.
31. Amir Faisal al Saud of Saudi Arabia made this statement in the General Assembly after passage of the resolution:

> "We have pledged ourselves before God and history to fulfill the Charter in good faith, thereby respecting human rights and repelling aggression. However, today's resolution has destroyed the Charter and all the covenants preceding it....the Government of Saudi Arabia registers. . .the fact that it does not consider itself bound by the resolution adopted today by the General Assembly. Furthermore, it reserves to itself the full right to act freely in whatever way it deems fit, in accordance with the principles of right and justice."

United Nations, General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), 2d Session, p 1425. Similar statements were made by the delegates of Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. See GAOR, 2d Session, pp 1426-27. "On 19 September [1947] the Political Committee of the League, meeting in Sofar, Lebanon, secretly decided to send troops into Palestine in case a partition plan were agreed upon." B. Y. Boustros-Ghali, "The Arab League 1945-1955," Intern. Conciliation, No. 498: 411 (May 54).

32. In a progress report submitted to the Security Council 16 Feb 48, the UN Palestine Commission concluded that it "...will be unable to establish security and maintain law and order, without which it cannot implement the resolution of the General Assembly, unless military forces in adequate strength are made available to the Commission when the responsibility for the administration of Palestine is transferred to it." From "United Nations Palestine Commission: First Special Report to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine," UN Document A/AC.21/9, included in UN Document S/676, 16 Feb 48. It was this increased violence and the difficulties of implementing the partition resolution that led to the US proposal that a trusteeship be established.
33. United Nations, UN Document S/745. See also UN Document S/748.
34. See Ref 24, pp 299–304. See also Shabtai Rosenne, Israel's Armistice Agreements with the Arab States: A Juridical Interpretation, Blumstein's Bookstores, Tel Aviv, 1951.
35. Estimates of Israel's ability to administer and economically sustain control of occupied territories have varied considerably. See, for example, Amos Ben-Vered, "Can Israel Afford the West Bank? Economists Look at the Facts," Jewish Observer and Middle East Rev. 16:6–7 (30 Jun 67); Moshe Ater, "Propping up the West Bank," Jerusalem Post Weekly, 14 Aug 67, p 9; Alvin Rosenfeld, "The Economics of Triumph," The Reporter, 37:22–25 (13 Jul 67).
36. See, for example, Foreign Minister Abba Eban's comments at a press conference on 14 Aug 67 in The New York Times, 15 Aug 67. Gideon Rafael, Israel's Ambassador to the UN, spelled out the requirement of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states in an address on 19 Aug 67. The Washington Post, 20 Aug 67.
37. See M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, St. Martin's Press, Inc., New York, 1966; John A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1940, 4th ed; and Harold Temperley, England and the Near East: The Crimea, Longmans Green, London, 1936.
38. See Richard N. Frye (ed), The Near East and the Great Powers, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1951; George Lenczowski, "Literature on the Clandestine Activities of the Great Powers in the Middle East," Middle East J. 8:205–11 (Spring 64); Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1964.
39. See Royal Institute of International Affairs, British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East, Oxford University Press, London, 1958. For an earlier assessment of British interests see Elizabeth Monroe, "British Interests in the Middle East," Middle East J., 2:129–46 (Apr 48).
40. See Table 13. For a discussion of British interests in bases and other facilities in the Arabian Peninsula area see Elizabeth Monroe, "Kuwait and Aden: A Contrast in British Policies," Middle East J., 18:53–74 (Winter 1964). See also Halford L. Hoskins, "Background of the British Position in Arabia," Middle East J., 1:137–47 (Apr 47) and Gillian King, Imperial Outpost—Aden: Its Place in British Strategic Policy, Oxford University Press, London, 1964. On 10 Apr 67, Mr. George Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a Parliamentary Question on the treaties and other agreements that oblige the UK to keep a military presence in the Persian Gulf, Cyprus, and Southeast Asia noted:

> "Our relation with the countries concerned are affected by a number of international instruments, including inter alia the South-East Collective Defence Treaty of 1954, the 1955 Pact of Mutual Co-operation (CENTO), the Anglo/ Malaysian Defence Agreements of 1957 and 1963, the Brunei Agreement of 1959, the 1960 (Cyprus) Treaties of Establishment and Guarantee, the 1961 Exchange of Notes with Kuwait and the various treaties and agreements relating to the Persian Gulf.... While none of these specifically requires us to maintain a military presence, Her Majesty's Government might consider at present that the current deployment of our forces is consistent both with the obligation to which these instruments give rise and with our general interests in the areas concerned."

For details on British commitments in the area see The Western Powers and the Middle East 1959: A Documentary Record, prepared by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Information Department, and distributed by the Oxford University Press, London, June 1959, especially pp 27-51. See also J. B. Kelly, "The British Position in the Persian Gulf," World Today, 20:238-49 (Jun 64); J. B. Kelly, "The Legal and Historical Basis of the British Position in the Persian Gulf," in St. Antony's Papers No. 4, 1958, pp 119-39; and D. C. Watt, "Britain and the Future of the Persian Gulf States," World Today, 20:488-96 (Nov 64). On the British posture "East of Suez" and the defense review of this position, see Labour Government's Defence White Paper of February 22, 1966, Cmnd. 2592, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1966; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966, Cmnd. 2901, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1966; Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967, Cmnd. 3203, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1967; Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy 1967, Cmnd. 3357, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1967.

41. On 26 Oct 67 Prime Minister Harold Wilson of England informed the House of Commons that the closing of the Suez Canal in the period following the Six Day war of June 1967 had cost England an average of $56 million per month. Much of that sum was expended in hard currencies for oil supplies to replace those normally forthcoming from the Middle East and that this had exacerbated Britain's balance-of-payments problems. The New York Times, 27 Oct 67.
42. Britain has a large stake in the Persian Gulf area—oil investments of perhaps £1000 million.
43. It should be noted, however, that the success of any Arab attempt to seriously endanger the pound would depend on inter-Arab cooperation to this end as no single Arab state is likely to do this unilaterally. Cooperation to this end is politically improbable as well as economically disadvantageous to the commercially minded Arab states, such as Lebanon and Libya, and would not be without its unattractive features for at least Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait is the critical state in this regard and, although vulnerable to pressure from other Arab states, the Kuwaitis have shown an agility in avoiding action they regard as unfavorable to themselves.
44. See "Treaty of Amity and Commerce: The Ottoman Empire and France, February 1535," in J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1535-1914, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., Princeton, N. J., 1956, Vol I, pp 1-5.
45. See Andre Burneau, Traditions et Politique de la France au Levant, Falcon, Paris, 1932, and Issac Lipschits, La Politique de la France au Levant, Durkkeri Kessing, Amsterdam, 1962.
46. David Wood, "The Armed Forces of African States," Adelphi Paper No. 27, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, Apr 66, p 10.
47. On the policy of "grandeur" pursued by de Gaulle's Fifth Republic and the broader international context of French Middle East policy see Edward A. Kolodziej, "Patterns of French Foreign Policy, 1958—1967," RAC-R-59, Research Analysis Corporation, in preparation.
48. On Germany's activities in the interwar period see Robert L. Melka, "The Axis and the Arab Middle East, 1930-1945," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1966.
49. In December 1955 West German Foreign Minister von Brentano announced the Hallstein Doctrine stating that the Federal Republic would withhold or withdraw formal diplomatic recognition from any government, except the Soviet Union, that formally recognized the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Perhaps the most serious challenge to the Doctrine occurred in 1965 in the Middle East. See Hans Speier, "Crisis and Catharsis in the Middle East 1965: A Chapter of German Foreign Policy," RAND-P-3615, The RAND Corporation, Jun 67.
50. See "Agreement Between the State of Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany," Israel Office of Information, New York, no date, which contains the full official text of the Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany signed at Luxembourg on 10 Sep 52 by Konrad Adenauer, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, and Moshe Sharett, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel. See also James Feron, "A German Ambassador to Israel," The New York Times Magazine, 31 Oct 65, pp 102, 114, 117, 119, 120, 122.

51. The EEC became an entity on 1 Jan 58 when the Treaty of Rome among Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands entered into force.
52. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Middle East and the European Common Market, The University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., 1964, provides a comprehensive study of this relationship.
53. For example, on 9 Jun 67 the official People's Daily charged the Soviet Union with "the most shameless betrayal and sellout" of the Arab states during the 1967 crisis. See The Washington Post, 10 Jun 67.
54. For some further discussion of the Chinese role in Syria, see Mae Handy Esterline, "Influence of the Army and Communism on Syrian Politics 1949-1967," M. A. thesis, George Washington University, Washington, D. C., Feb 68.
55. For a concise discussion of the Soviet oil industry, see "Fresh View of Russian Competition," Petrol. Press Serv., 31:162-63 (May 64) and "New Setting for Soviet Exports," Petrol. Press Serv., 33:165-68 (May 66).
56. For a description of Soviet activities in the Northern Tier see G. Nollau and Hans J. Wiehe, Russia's South Flank: Soviet Operations in Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York 1963.
57. "Treaty of Friendship: Turkey and Russia, 16 March 1921," in Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 95-97.
58. "Treaty of Friendship: Persia and Russia, 26 February - 12 December 1921," in Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 90-94. For an evaluation of this document from the vantage point of Iran see Rouhollah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Policy of Iran: A Developing Nation in World Affairs, 1500-1941, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., 1966; for the Western and Russian views see Nasrollah S. Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923: Anglo-Russian Power Politics in Iran, R. F. Moore, New York, 1952. See also George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949.
59. For the text of the Pact, see Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 214-16. See also D. C. Watt, "The Sa'dabad Pact of July 8, 1937," Royal Central Asian J., 49:296-306 (Jul - Oct 62) and Abbas Khalatbary, L'Iran et le Pacte Oriental, Editions A. Pedone, Paris, 1938, Thèse pour le Doctorat, Universite de Paris, Faculte de Droit, 1938.
60. The reasons for Russia's initial support of Israel as manifested in its vote for partition, its de jure recognition, and its support of Israel's two applications for UN membership have been the subject of much speculation. It is probable that the Soviets were hoping to create a power vacuum in the area that it could later fill. The prospects for such an eventuality were good. The Zionists were anti-British and their militant nationalism seemed to offer a better chance than Arab nationalism for eliminating British influence. At the same time the creation of a strong Jewish state would intensify the conflicts in the Middle East, creating a situation in which communism could thrive. Soviet strategists took into account the strong ties between the Jewish communities in the US and in Palestine and feared the possibility that the US would supplant Britain in the Middle East, thereby thwarting their plans. If, however, the Soviet Union supported the new state it could reduce American influence and increase its own. Also considered was the Russian or East European origin of many of Israel's leaders—a situation that could make Russia's attempts to gain influence a simpler matter. The left-of-center positions of most of Israel's political parties, as reflected in their pre-State political platforms, their adoption of pro-Soviet or neutral foreign policy positions, and the existence of an Israeli Communist Party, seemed to improve Russia's prospects for gaining a foothold in the Middle East. See Hurewitz, Ref 27, pp 287, 306-07, 323-24; Walter Z. Laqueur, The Soviet Union and the Middle East, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1959, pp 146-50; David J. Dallin, "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, 6:337-44 (Nov 55), especially pp 341-42.
61. See Laqueur, Ref 60, p 150.
62. See Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 401-05. The catalyst for the Czechoslovakian-Egyptian arms deal was an Israeli raid in Gaza during 1955 in retaliation for raids by "fedayeen" in Israeli territory. After the Israeli raid, which dramatically emphasized the weakness of the Egyptian army, Nasser asked the West for arms and when refused he turned to the Soviets.

63. For a brief overview of the Soviet aid and trade offensive see Dept of State, "Communist Governments and Developing Nations: Economic Aid and Trade," Research Memorandum RSB-80, 21 Jul 67.
64. For details on the Communist Parties in the region see Dept of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "World Strength of Communist Party Organizations, 19th Annual Report," Publication 8239, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1967. On the Communist Party of Israel before its recent split into two successors see Moshe M. Czudnowski and Jacob M. Landaw, The Israeli Communist Party and the Elections for the Fifth Knesset, 1961, Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, & Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif., 1965.
65. All three states have refused to accede to Soviet requests for bases thus far. See, for example, Anthony Carthew, "There Is No False Courage Left in Egypt," The New York Times Magazine, 3 Dec 67, p 144.
66. On this earliest period of US activity in the Middle East, see David H. Finnie, Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East, Harvard Middle Eastern Studies 13, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1967.
67. See John A. DeNovo, American Interests and Policies in the Middle East 1900-1939, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, Minn., 1963.
68. The position of the US on the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine is considered in Carl J. Friedrich, American Policy toward Palestine, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1944; Frank E. Manuel, The Realities of American-Palestine Relations, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1949; Reuben Fink (ed), America and Palestine: The Attitude of Official America and the American People Toward a Rebuilding of Palestine as a Free and Democratic Jewish Commonwealth, American Zionist Emergency Council, New York, 1944; and Margaret Patricia Carey, "American Foreign Policy toward Palestine," M.A. thesis 1556, University of Virginia, Aug 48.
69. For the text of the Truman Doctrine, see Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 273–75.
70. The lack of an overall schema from which specific commitments could be drawn was evidenced, in part, by a distinct irresoluteness in US action and statements during UN discussions of the partition resolution that paved the way for the establishment of Israel. Yet, less than 4 months later, the US delegate submitted a proposal for a temporary trusteeship for Palestine under the Trusteeship Council and a suspension of efforts to implement partition. It was during the debate on this proposal that Israel was proclaimed an independent state and President Truman announced recognition of "the Provisional Government [of Israel] as the de facto authority of the new State of Israel." The Tripartite Declaration became a major component of US Middle East policy when it was enunciated in 1950.
71. Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, Public Law 85-7, (85th Congress, 1st Session) 9 May 57. On the Eisenhower Doctrine see "The Eisenhower Doctrine: Beginnings of the Middle East Policy," Round Table, 47:141–47 (Mar 57); and Hasnum Djalal, "The Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East," M. A. thesis, Dept of Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., June 59. For the Congressional hearings on the Doctrine see: US Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services (85th Congress, 1st Session) "Hearings, The President's Proposal on the Middle East," (2 parts), US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1957 and US Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, (85th Congress, 1st Session) Hearings, on H. J. Res. 117, "Economic and Military Cooperation with Nations in the General Area of the Middle East," US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1957. The Doctrine provided for economic and military cooperation to assist nations in the general area of the Middle East in strengthening and defending their independence. Economic assistance was to be provided to any nation in the area "desiring such assistance in the development of economic strength dedicated to the maintenance of national independence." The President was also authorized to undertake military assistance programs with any nation in the area. A third basic principle incorporated in this Resolution was the recognition by the US "as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." To ensure this aim "the United States is prepared to use armed forces" in support of states "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism."

72. In the Tripartite Declaration of 25 May 50 the US declared, in concert with the UK and France, its "deep interest in and...desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area...." In a letter to members of Congress, dated 6 Feb 56, Secretary Dulles commented: "...it is our belief that the security of states in the Near East cannot rest upon arms alone but rather upon the establishment of friendly relations among neighbors. We are actively working toward the establishment of such relations." "Exchange of Letters Between Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Forty Members of the House of Representatives," Middle Eastern Affairs, 7:107 (Mar 56). On 23 May 67 President Johnson commented: "The United States, as a member of the United Nations, and as a nation dedicated to a world order based on law and mutual respect, has actively supported efforts to maintain peace in the Near East" [underscoring added]. In support of this the President also indicated "The world community has a vital interest in peace and stability in the Near East...." Dept of State Bull., 12 Jun 67, p 870. Eugene V. Rostow, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, has noted: "In the Middle Eastern crisis we have pursued an even-handed course in behalf of our own strong national interest and stability in the area" [underscoring added]. Eugene V. Rostow, "Department Opposes Elimination of Import Quotas on Extra Long Staple Cotton," Dept of State Bull., 57, 21 Aug 67, p 237.

73. "Let me say that the foreign policy of the United States...embraces the principle of maintaining our friendship with Israel and the Arab states." Dulles, "Exchange of Letters," p 106. In a letter to Senator Mansfield on 8 Jun 67, President Johnson made the following observations regarding US policy in the Middle East:

> "Let me emphasize that the US continues to be guided by the same basic policies which have been followed by the Administration and three previous Administrations. These policies have always included a consistent effort on our part to maintain good relations with all the peoples of the area in spite of the difficulties caused by some of their leaders. This remains our policy despite the unhappy rupture which has been declared by several Arab states."

Dept of State Bull. 26 Jun 67, p 952.

74. For example, early in 1963 an increased effort was made by the PCC to achieve some progress in the dispute. In response to continued prodding by the General Assembly, which had been more recently expressed in General Assembly Resolution 1856 (XVII) of 20 Dec 62, the PCC met early in 1963 to decide on an appropriate course of action. The US suggested that as a member of the PCC it "might initiate a series of quiet talks with the parties concerned—Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Arab Republic." The five governments were to be approached at a high level and the talks were to be held without any preconditions as to the final solution. United Nations, "United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine Twenty-First Progress Report," UN Document A/5545, 1 Nov 63, p 1. Talks were conducted under the auspices of the US. (Mrs. Golda Meir, then Israel's Foreign Minister, confirmed that "quiet talks" had taken place in a speech before the UN Special Political Committee on 15 Nov 63. For a summary and excerpts of this address, see Israel Digest, 23 Nov 63, pp 1–2. See also Israel Digest, 6 Dec 63, pp 1 and 8.) The US kept the PCC informed of the progress of this approach and concluded that "the talks had been useful. All sides had shown good will, a desire to achieve progress on the refugee problem, and a desire to continue the talks...." UN Document A/5545, 1 Nov 63, p 2.

75. It was this embargo that necessitated Israel's arms purchases from Czechoslovakia. See Netanel Lorch, The Edge of the Sword: Israel's War of Independence, 1947–1949, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1961, pp 79–80 and 329–30, and Jon and David Kimche, A Clash of Destinies: The Arab-Jewish War and the Founding of the State of Israel, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1960, especially pp 75–76 and 204–05.

76. For the text of the "Tripartite Declaration on Security in the Arab-Israel Zone," see Hurewitz, Ref 24, pp 308–09.

77. During a press conference on 3 Apr 63, President Kennedy made the following comment in reply to a question concerning the activities of German scientists in the UAR:

> "We will just have to see what the balance of the military power may be in the Middle East, as time goes on. We are anxious to see it diminished rather than participate in encouraging it. On the other hand, we would be

reluctant to see a military balance of power in the Middle East which was such as to encourage aggression rather than discourage it....At the present time, there is a balance which I think would discourage military action on either side. I hope it will continue."

This position was reiterated during his press conference on 8 May 63:

"We seek to limit the Near East arms race which obviously takes resources from an area already poor, and puts them into an increasing race which does not really bring any great security."

The decision in the fall of 1962 to sell Hawk missiles to Israel was apparently in line with this basic position. It was agreed that the US would sell the Hawk, a short-range defensive missile, to Israel in an effort to offset Soviet Bloc weapons that had previously been supplied to Israel's Arab neighbors. It was reported that the decision to supply these missiles to Israel was made only after completion of a detailed study of the military equipment supplied by the Communist Bloc to the UAR, Syria, and Iraq. The evaluation made by the Defense Department concluded "that the Middle Eastern balance of power would begin to tip in the Arabs' favor" and "that such an imbalance would encourage either an attack upon Israel or a 'preventive' war by Israel to destroy some of the Arab offensive power." The New York Times, 27 Sep 62. As a result, the US decided to honor Israel's request for defensive missiles so that a balance could once again be achieved and the precarious peace in the area be maintained. Government spokesmen hastened to point out that the US "had no intention of becoming 'a major supplier' of weapons to the Middle East." The New York Times, 28 Sep 62. See also "Missiles to Israel," The New York Times, 28 Sep 62. During a press conference Secretary Rusk noted:

"We have ourselves tried not to become a principal supplier of arms in that region, but we are commited to the political independence and the territorial integrity of the states of the Middle East. And when imbalances of a major proportion occurred, we felt it was necessary for us to supply some limited military assistance to certain of the Arab countries and to Israel."

Dept of State Bull.,7 Aug 67, p 160. See also Table 49.

78. For further details see Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Program Coordination, "US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations: Obligations and Loan Authorizations July 1, 1945–June 30, 1966," 17 Mar 67.

79. One study concluded: "Security for the free world today depends less on military alliances and more on the scale and pace of the development of underdeveloped nations and the fulfillment of the aspirations of newly independent peoples." Regional Development for Regional Peace: A New Policy and Program to Counter the Soviet Menace in the Middle East, The Public Affairs Institute, Washington, D. C., undated, p 40. The Act for International Development of 1961 (Public Law 87–195) included the following statement:

"It is the sense of the Congress that peace depends on wider recognition of the dignity and interdependence of men, and survival of free institutions in the United States can best be assured in a world wide atmosphere of freedom. To this end, the United States has in the past provided assistance to help strengthen the forces of freedom by aiding peoples of less-developed friendly countries of the world to develop their resources and improve their living standards, to realize their aspirations for justice, education, dignity, and respect as individual human beings, and to establish responsible governments."

US Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Reorganization and International Organizations (88th Congress, 1st Session), "Report of a Study of United States Foreign d in Ten Middle Eastern and African Countries," submitted by Senator Ernest Gruening, US Govt Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1 Oct 63, p 465. See also "Objectives and Conditions of Foreign Economic Aid," pp 465-72.

80. In reply to a question regarding the effects of US economic and military cooperation with the states of the Middle East under the provisions of the Eisenhower Doctrine, Secretary of State Dulles replied: "I believe that this program will create an atmosphere in the area which will make it much more likely that the disputes between

Israel and its Arab neighbors can be brought to a conclusion and a state of stability and order reestablished." See "Hearings on H. J. Res. 117," Ref 71, p 144.

81. Ambassador Raymond A. Hare in a RAC seminar on the Middle East Crisis, 6 Jul 67. In a statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 22 Mar 66, Ambassador Hare, then Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, supported US foreign aid in the Near East and South Asia with the following statement:

> "When there is violence and instability in the Middle East and South Asia, the threat extends to ourselves as well as to our friends in the area; and our resources—as well as theirs—are diverted. With peace and increasing stability they, with our assistance, can concentrate upon the building of independent, self-sustaining, democratic societies. At this juncture our assistance—though only a fraction of the total country investment—is frequently the crucial element in the maintenance of order, the building of infrastructure for production, or the development of basic human resources."

Dept of State Bull., 25 Apr 66, p 671.

82. "The main objective of the United States in the Near and Middle East is to prevent rivalries and conflicts of interest in that area from developing into open hostilities which eventually might lead to a third world war. Until all the countries of the Near and Middle East are politically and economically sound, and until their governments become stable and are able to preserve internal order and to take measures to improve the living standards of their populations, the Near and Middle East will continue to present a temptation to powers outside the area. As long as this temptation exists the danger of conflict which may lead to war will continue to be present."

Statement by Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State, summarizing the objectives of US policy in the Near and Middle East. From an address delivered in Los Angeles, 19 Sep 46, reprinted in Middle East J., 1:85–86 (19 Jan 47).

83. As a large oil consumer the US is basically concerned with low-cost and dependable energy supplies, and as a large oil producer the US in interested in security for its domestic oil industry and its continued protection. In the Middle East the US is concerned with obtaining fair treatment for US oil interests and with the stability of Middle Eastern oil-producing states in order to assure security of supply to its allies (particularly Western Europe) and, to a lesser extent, to itself. US dependence on Middle East oil is limited. For example, assuming an embargo of Middle East oil, Texas and Louisiana could produce an additional 2 to 3 million barrels per day, which would be sufficient to replace the embargoed supply. Wall Street Journal, 7 Jun 67. See Table 18.

84. In the Persian Gulf states, US investors hold about half of all Persian Gulf concessions, with monopolies in four of the nine states, and major prospecting rights in another three; Americans produce 20 percent of the total oil supply there and have large stakes in an international corporation producing another 55 percent.

85. It should be noted that the US is not vitally dependent on the Middle East for any of these factors although denial of them would result in dislocation of US activities in the Middle East and adjacent areas.

86. In an address on "American Policy in the Near East," 20 Jan 64, U. Alexis Johnson, then Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, noted: "...as a fundamental contribution to world peace, we are deeply concerned with helping to create political stability, to advancing economic development and to modernizing the social systems of the area." U. Alexis Johnson, "American Policy in the Near East," Dept of State Bull., 50:209 (10 Feb 64).

87. Dept of State, "United States Policy in the Near East Crisis," Publication 8269, Aug 67, p 18. For an elaboration of the US position on a Middle East settlement based on the Five Principles, see "Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg in the Security Council, November 15, 1967," Press Release USUN-191, 15 Nov 67.

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